Saturday, June 14, 2014

Losing Iraq?

Losing Iraq?


I have been, over the last few days, enthralled with the news coming out of Iraq.  This is not to say that I have enjoyed it, but it is to say that I have been very alert to it.  This actually isn't a “just this week” thing, it’s been months, and years in the making.  So, I went ahead and posted to twitter/Facebook, Fareed Zakaria’s analysis of the situation as of yesterday morning (http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fareed-zakaria-who-lost-iraq-the-iraqis-did-with-an-assist-from-george-w-bush/2014/06/12/35c5a418-f25c-11e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html).  I typically find his opinions and prognostications to be “spot on” and in this case he is very close.  Being an Iraqi War vet, it is inevitable that I will be asked my opinion in the coming days, so this is meant to beat you all to the punch.  This is how I see it from my point of view; there are certain to be others and they are sure to be different.  Take it, leave it, but here we go:

To start with, let me express my thoughts on the origin of our involvement in Iraq in 2003 onward.  After the events of September 11, 2001, the world changed.  We, for really good reasons, took on the mantle of fighting a "Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT).  This, like the eradication of high seas piracy in the 19th century[i], is a task that is necessary and the right thing to do.  Such an effort is not a war against a nation-state but instead a concerted multi-national effort that leads to the extermination of a global order disease which time has finally come to an end.  Terrorism, as a tactic, had great growth in the Cold War era as a means to engage in low level conflict and protest, short of conventional war and creating the direct involvement of nation-states against each other.  Such proxy actions grew in frequency, level of lethality, and broadness of application (across a full spectrum of cultures, locations, and prefaces).  This is an important distinction, as part of my great support for fighting a GWOT, in that it has a moral and more universal calling. 

Our actions in Afghanistan, therefore, in 2002, to go after those that perpetrated the act against us on 9-11, were the right things to do.  We needed to demonstrate our resolve, to garner the world's rage against this immoral tactic (that was let to continue for way too long), put those on notice that had sponsored such a tactic (or tacitly allowed it to exist), and build a wide coalition that was galvanized and built to engage in combat through the full spectrum of national and non-national power (Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics).  But when the administration turned to the next battle that needed to be fought in this "Long War", it was (and remains decidedly my opinion) that Iraq was not the right field of battle to be fought on.  Such an effort, GWOT, should never have been pigeon-holed into "Islamic fundamentalist" terrorism, and regardless if we never uttered that prefix, going into another Middle Eastern country as the next front we were going to open, spoke loudly that we had narrowed the scope of our effort and its universal calling was lost.  Now we had to defend our actions against the assertion that we were fighting a war on Islam itself.  Now we couldn't easily defend against an assertion that we were simply seeking a geopolitical play to insert and dominate the Middle East in a way not seen since the colonial era.  Now we showed that it was hollow rhetoric that the GWOT would be not fought only with military forces but through numerous other forms of action.  Now we had to make a guard action against critics that we were using this as a means to secure natural resources (a.k.a. Oil).  And now we lost the goodwill and universality that was behind us only two years earlier, leaving us with cobbling together a “Coalition of the Willing” of Britain (our always stalwart ally) and a group of “up and comer” states or those that could hardly be called world players in the least.

While it is a clear counter-factual to put it forward, my answer to what to do after assaulting the Taliban and Al Queda in Afghanistan is to have confronted a number of other terrorist issues the world round.  Our next battlefield (since we had the initiative and choice) would have been better served if we had taken on FARC in South America, Shining Tigers in Sri Lanka, engaged in meaningful actions in several sub-Saharan African states, or worked to aid our British allies in its final and complete resolution and reconciliation of the winding down conflict over Northern Ireland.  And while these would be superb places to choose, my personal favorite action would have been to address the narco-terrorism just south of our border in Mexico and Central America.  Alas we didn't make this choice, and instead chose to settle an old score with a rogue leader, who was clearly villainous and stubbing nose at the international community.  Did he have weapons of mass destruction?  Well after a long drawn out drama and search, we are left wanting in that answer.  Regardless of all the reasons we can now justify the decision to go into Iraq (and I admit at some point we needed to contend with Saddam Hussein and his regime), in the context of the GWOT, I just can’t say that it was the correct next strategic move.

So, I have made my position clear on the choice to go into Iraq.  But when we chose to do that, did we really understand the implications?  I am not going to comment here on the sales job used to get the American public and other leaders (Congress et. al.) to go along with it, as that is a topic for another day.  Instead, I am talking about what we did to plan for the effort once it was the decision made.  Secretary of State and GEN Colin Powell infamously stated the “Pottery Barn rule: You break it, you own it.” in regards to the implications of invading Iraq and taking over the county as a warning in the drum up to this invasion[ii].  So if we look back at the run up and planning for the action we took, much was done, and I remember it greatly as we fixated on Operations Plan 10-03 and its developing variant (10-03V), in late 2002 and early 2003.  Much of the talk and thinking was that when we invaded we would be met with open arms, the well-educated Iraqi population would take over the task of governing themselves, oil revenues would subsidize and pay for the effort as well as the Iraqi led rebuilding effort, and we would build a grateful democratic ally in the very center of the Middle East.  This narrative fit well into the neo-con anti-nation building mantra.  Thus all planning efforts focused on the invasion and military conquest, and limited if any effort was made to plan for “the day after”.  Actually, I can recall those who questioned our lack of thinking-though our involvement after the invasion, as being told a mantra like “we are going to take as much risk leaving as we are in going in[iii]” or getting askance looks if they were to suggest that we would have to engage in a meaningful rebuilding and security effort once the conventional war ended.  GEN Eric Shinseki was famously ostracized by Paul Wolfowitz for his comment that it would take “something in the order of several hundred thousand soldiers” to pacify and control Iraq after the invasion[iv].  So, when it comes to my thoughts on the conduct of the invasion and the efforts in the early days of the Iraq war, I have to relay one of my most poignant stories from June 2003 in Baghdad.

Our unit, a Combat Heavy Engineer Battalion, was the first of its kind to make its way to Baghdad as a part of TF Iron (part of 1st Armor Division) who followed the 3d Infantry Division in the northern invasion thrust.  After leading the first convoy north from Kuwait in the very early hours of June 1st, A Company had worked for a couple weeks on building a bed down site in what was formerly a field, literally a mine field, asking each day what our mission was to be.  And just before I was temporarily reassigned for a special mission in downtown Baghdad rooting out insurgents, we held a meeting with the Company leadership.  Paul Drezen, the Company Commander, having now heard the inquiry of each of his platoon leaders and platoon sergeants at least a dozen times ask, “what is our mission” or “what is the plan”, was simply frustrated to his limit (and the daily temps warming up well past the upper 90s and low 100s without a stitch of A/C may have also had something to do with it).  In this meeting, one of the leadership team again asked this question, and Paul, in utter frustration, launched an apple across the room and yawped “there is no fucking plan!”  In a nutshell, that is the reality of the situation for the first 6 to 9 months after “major combat operations” had ended[v].  After doing some minimal tasks and fill-in work, at one point, one of my soldiers finally had enough and spoke out talking about his being “Underemployed in Iraq” in a letter to the editor of Stars and Stripes[vi].  Thus the truth is that no one minded Powell’s advice and even made the attempt to recognize the need for a plan and the ownership for fixing the broken Iraq once we had opted to invade.

Now that I have taken on two points, and have been rather honest in my not being enthralled with the choice to center on Iraq as the next point of attack or with the planning for the occupation, I need to square this with my taking part and following orders as a loyal soldier.  Let’s start with an old euphemism:  “Our job is not to ask how or why, but to do or die.”  I am an Army Officer, and as such I have sworn a very sacred oath (I said I swore to God).  Let me relay that Oath to you, verbatim, as I uttered it on May 17, 1997:  “I, Erik C. Backus, having been appointed an officer in the Army of the United States, as indicated above in the grade of O-1, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter; So help me God.”  Regardless of my personal or political feelings, my reasoning or any emotional calling I may feel, I have made a promise, and if I learned nothing from the character given to me from my years in scouting and leadership, your promise is what make you who you are.  So when you talk to soldiers, especially soldiers who are called to be leaders, we understand that once all of the debating is done, it is time for us to salute, adopt the decision, and execute as if it was our own idea, with passion, violence, and vigor.  Nothing is less true for me and this effort.  I had and have my qualms on whether it was the right decision, I may know that the plan is utterly flawed and devoid of needed resources to ensure victory, and I personally simply may not want to go (and trust me getting the call that I was being deployed on valentine’s day weekend in 2003 was a serious downer; never mind spending my wife’s birthday at Fort Leonard Wood getting my collective stuff together); but I am a man of honor, and I am honor bound to do my duty.  That oath I swore says that I will support and defend the constitution, and to do that I have to obey the will of the people (the document starts with “We the people …” after all) and not my personal whims and judgments, at least in regards to whether I hazard to obey those authorities.  Several high profile cases have occurred where others have forgotten this oath and this sacred duty and tried to shirk or obviate from it.  Regardless of my reservations, I would not be caught ever as being disloyal in that way, nor should we ever let those that have taken the office I have taken, do so (for if we do, we allow the prerogative of one to trump the will of the people, and that is antithetical to the core of the American democratic experiment).

I have now used very lofty and noble terms have talked about my military service and how I have approached being an Officer in the US Army, especially in my taking up the mandate of serving in a war zone, in Iraq.  But, I think I am part of the problem; well actually, I think everyone else has the problem, I just think that my attitudes effect everyone else’s problem.  The problem I am talking about, and it relates to our getting into Iraq, the prosecution of any concerted national effort, war or otherwise, is that we have a 1% problem.  By 1% I am not talking to an economic number.  I am talking to a much more (potentially) insidious problem, the percentage of those that have taken an oath and put themselves in the position to be a bullet catcher and/or a bullet shooter on behalf of “We the People”.  Sebastian Junger talks about this, in his discussion of how some soldiers who take on this mandate deal with the emotional, mental, and psychological effects of combat when they come back home[vii].  This 1% represents those that have the level of commitment I have, and have actioned on it.  It is also a testament to how our society has changed in the last 75 years.  The idea that we all hold such a sacred duty has been diluted; and as such the common person’s understanding and appreciation of the service rendered is equally lost.  This is a dangerous thing.  It isn't dangerous because we need to broaden military service; it’s dangerous because we have failed to broaden and inculcate a culture of selfless service.  To this point, when we look back to the days, weeks, and months after the attacks of 9-11, the number one question Americans, and the vast majority globally, asked was “How can we serve?”  The answer given was “go out and buy a Chevy.”  That isn't exactly what we were asking, I am certain of it.  But it speaks to the problem.  Our leaders have sold us a new definition of what civic virtue is all about; it’s a definition that this virtue is fungible.  It neglects the self-reflection required to require sacrifice.  And as a consequence it is easy for the 99% to be persuaded to commit the sacrifice of a small minority to a mission of futility, error, or success.  And this translates well beyond military service (whether it be foreign service, the peace corps, inner city education, border security, or any other niche effort that requires giving up comfort and your life for a greater cause).  And what I am postulating here is that because of this loss of core values of universal sacrifice and service (beyond and without a value that can be substituted), going headlong into a new war or understanding the implications of our domestic or foreign policy is a task that we, as a people, are ill equipped to handle.  And it is those that have made sacrifices that are the odd ones out, and to some extent (because we have continued to buoy the facade that we can go on this way) are why we went into and out of Iraq/Afghanistan the way we have.

This then turns me to another part of my thoughts on the last weeks’ worth of news on Iraq.  When I was deployed for my second tour, our Brigade commander gathered the entire headquarters for a discussion and talked about our mission and how our efforts would be long studied and remembered given the impacts we had made on Iraq.  Without question this commander was brilliant, and was adroit in citing the long view of history as it related to what he was discussing.  He hearkened back to the Roman Empire and reasoned that one of the things that led to the failure of the Roman largess was that they began to show weakness and that the “barbarians” outside the borders of the Empire smelled it[viii].  This thesis is not without merit, but you need to be mindful of the setting of the “show of weakness”.  To cut to the quick here, if there is a goal to prevent the demise of American influence on world events, we need to watch, ameliorate, and control our hubris and our ethnocentrism as Americans.  Certainly I believe that the US is the best nation that has ever existed in the history of the earth.  And I am not discounting that we have much much more to offer.  That doesn’t mean, however, that we ought to pick fights/put ourselves into situations where we risk our leading position and ability to enable humanity at large to enjoin us in our march towards freedom, liberty and progress.  It means we need to be the beacon on the hill that the world is drawn to, rather than the spot light in their face that blinds them.  This is why not every fight is our fight, not every problem is ours to solve.  And we have to remember our principles are the core piece and not only the government form that is supposed to protect them.  So an Iraq, Haiti, Thailand, or a Kenya may have a way to get themselves to a just state that honors the rule of law through a very different way than getting people to the voting booth.  It certainly means that we need to hold up our example of republican government as an ongoing experiment, one that is in constant need of maintenance, and not the end-all be-all of political systems.  And it means that we can’t continue to spew out hollow, unsupported largess the world round, as the thin veiled shell that is created by such bellicose invites a test of our resolve and will surely find it wanting in one place or another.  We need to under promise, over execute, and recognize our true strength is in our character as a people; a character that others can aspire to obtain.

Let us, then, talk about inspiration.  I served two tours in Iraq.  The first, from 2003-2004, was the one that started without a plan, and went on to fail to stop rioting/looting, dismiss the Iraqi Army enmasse, engage in a systematic campaign of deBaathification, fail to bring the resources to bear to be able to re-build and build a sustainable economy, and resulted in the start of widespread unrest as I was departing in May 2004.  Succinctly, on the whole, this was not inspirational.  And as I watched from the US for the next 3 years, the story didn't really change, as what appeared to be happening was just spiraling to an ever increasingly challenging situation.  But, the story was not over.  After recognizing the reality was different than the dream, the administration under the leadership of voices that converted from “never do nation building” to another place, proposed one massive push to turn the tide and re-engage in a new way.  “Take, hold, build” was the mantra, and a brilliant leader, who hadn't followed the trend in the first year of the war that everyone else had, was appointed to lead the charge: GEN David Petreaus.  Using his on-the-ground experience in northern Iraq (when he was a division commander of the famed 101st Air Assault Division), armed with a new set of doctrines that were gleaned from the annals of history, and given the actual resources to make the difference that was needed, he, with the team assembled around him and the country of Iraq, was able to turn the war on its head during “The Surge”.  In the 18 months that started in the spring of 2007, every major indicator was adjusted in a positive direction.  Bridges got built, unemployment went down, security was established, and Iraq started working again.  This was inspiring and it was the right thing to do (even if I was somewhat jaded about its possibilities at the outset).

What I am trying to relay by discussing the Surge, and my part in it, is that one of the most powerful things we can do as Americans is make space for success.  COL James Coggin, the Brigade Commander of 3d Training Brigade in 1997-1999, spoke of it as “creating an environment for success”.  As I articulated above, we can’t expect every culture, people or nation to follow our path to the high ground.  We can, however, give them the safe space, the boundaries of protection, and the seeds that allow their version of the liberty tree to grow.  But it ultimately is up to them, up to those people to do it.  We can drill the well, we can provide the water purification system, we can train them on how to maintain it, and we can pipe the water that comes out of the system to their homes, but we can’t make them drink it (a modern way of saying, “you can bring a horse to water, but can’t force it to drink”).  The leadership the world craves is this creating space, its enabling a surge, but it isn't dictating our terms.  Our unrivaled rise to power in the 20th century was based upon building alliances, meeting on common ground, and ultimately being the “convener in chief”[ix].  And as we look to how we fight the GWOT, we can’t forget that this is what we do best, and it is also the way that we have been able to create a pervasive world order that serves us well while also letting others go their own way.

So this brings us to my comments on the ever present counter-factual question of “should we have stayed?”  Frankly, I don’t know.  But my sense is that if we couldn't get a SOFA that protected those of us who were going to be there to continue the effort, it wasn't worth staying.  I reiterate, what we can do best is give the space, we can get them to the edge of the lake, but we can’t make them swim in it.  And while the current administration should have certainly pressed to the Nth degree to enable us to follow-up on the strategic victory we had in the Surge, there is also a point to be made that we have to cut the umbilical cord at some point.  And we also have to recognize that a Marshall Plan like solution in Iraq was simply not in the offing for numerous reasons[x].  So we need to level with ourselves about what kinds of commitments we make.  To that end, we are where we are in regards to not having troops in Iraq, less by desire and more by pragmatic realities; realities we can no-longer ignore lest we sacrifice more of our future.  Thus I go back to we have to be much more introspective and clear about those battles we are going to fight or those efforts we are going to take on.

Now back to the news of the week.  Is Iraq lost?  The one thing that I take issue with in Fareed’s analysis is the imminent and ultimate collapse of the present Iraqi state.  Surely the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) taking “control” of Mosul and Tikrit, and making its way south, is troubling and doesn't spell a good outcome.  The struggle, however, is far from over.  Just this morning, reports were that Shia Arab Iraqis were answering the call to arms issued by Ayatollah Sistani.  Likewise, it is certain that the Kurds in Northern Iraq are not going to succumb to this insurgent group, and may be more than willing to come down from the hills and thwart their gains.  So, I am not so certain we can call the game before it’s played here.  I am certain it will be a mess and bloody.  And it will be something that will not comfort any of us who did our best to build an Iraq that could execute the power brokering as well as the political and sectarian resolutions needed to be a beacon of stability in the Middle East.  But in the end, I would not be surprised if a stable nation state emerged from the ashes, and perhaps that is the way it has to be.  Unless we intend to make Iraq a part of the United States unilaterally, we have little choice but to accept it isn't up to us what the Iraqi future is.  Not jumping back in does not mean we failed before, nor does ISIS pressing its way through the country.  It just means we have to let it play out for and with the Iraqi’s themselves.

What I am struck by, as I conclude, is how Fareed continues to hit issues on their head.  One of my favorite texts by him is “The Future of Freedom:  Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad”.  I first read this text just after arriving home in 2004 from Iraq.  Its concluding chapter, the afterword, is entitled “The 51st State”[xi].  Fareed in a few pages provides an erudite analysis of the situation with the invasion and its immediate aftermath.  He then goes on to provide a prognostication based upon the fundamental thesis of the book (that democracy follows the development of a constitutional structure and rule of law, not the other way around).  He writes: “In the next year or two, it will likely seem that democracy in Iraq is working.  A new government will be formed.  Elections will be held.  Hope will fill the air.  But that does not necessarily mean that democracy in Iraq will last.  The decay of democracy usually takes place a few years after the birth.  It can be prevented, of course, and the United States should do all it can to make democracy stick.  But ultimately it is Iraqis who will build the new Iraq.”  I think we have done what we could, it was a noble and worthwhile effort even given its mistaken origins, and I couldn't agree more with his ultimate conclusion.




[i] For a great discussion of this connection, see Caleb Carr's “The Lessons of Terror:  A History of Warfare Against Civilians: Why It Has Always Failed and Why It Will Fail Again”, written in 2002
[ii] From Bob Woodward’s “Plan of Attack” in 2004
[iii] In October 2002 I was lucky enough to get an opportunity to attend my War-Trace conference with the 36th Engineer Brigade (then stationed at Fort Benning) and was read in on the base OPLAN 10-03, which was then under review.  In speaking with the FORSCOM Engineer he spoke to this very attitude.
[iv] See Shinseki’s Testimony and http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/28/us/threats-responses-military-spending-pentagon-contradicts-general-iraq-occupation.html
[v] I’m referring to the “Mission Accomplished Speech” by President George W. Bush on May 1, 2003
[vi] By Justin Stenger, a talented soldier and hard worker who wanted nothing more than to make a contribution for the good of his country; http://www.stripes.com/opinion/letters-to-the-editor-for-wednesday-november-19-2003-1.14619
[vii] If you have any desire to really start to get at the perspective of solders who have been engaged in combat in the modern age in Afghanistan and Iraq, you need to read “War” by Sebastian.  Probably the best journalism/book that I have ever encountered on the perspective of a soldier like myself in how we see ourselves and the wars we have fought.
[viii] BG Peter “Duke” Deluca, channeling Edward Gibbon and “The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire”
[ix] For example:  Eleanor Roosevelt and the process that led to the UN Charter
[x] If we look at the comparisons between 2010 and 1945, several things come to light:  1) After the devastation of WWII, the US was largely untouched, and as a result was the only remaining world power that had the ability to produce goods in mass quantities without massive investments.  Thus, we were in an enviable economic situation, without rival (the USSR, especially east of the Urals, also was not as devastated, but its industrial centers were set back at least a decade).  In 2010, the story was and remains different.  China and India, among others, are in serious competition with us economically, and our savings reserves are non-existent.  2) Iraq/Afghanistan are not Europe.  By this I mean, all of the European states were rebuilding in a cultural context similar to our own and thus the ability to resurrect democratic governance, rule of law, religious and cultural norms was much less foreign and relatable to the common American.  The Middle East continues to represent a distinctly different world than ours, and while there are connections, they are much more tenuous and hard to relate.  3) Europe in 1945 didn't have a trust fund status.  By this I mean, there wasn't some signature natural resource that was needed by the world that was going to be argued over and cause a societal rift.  Iraq’s oil is a blessing and a curse in this regard.  4) Europe had settled the religious divide question in Christianity after an exhaustive period that it had no desire to repeat.  The Middle East has been prevented from having the conflict required to resolve the Sunni/Shia rift, first by the Ottomans, then by the Sykes-Picot European creation, and then by the overshadow of the Cold War.  We are now seeing the outbursts of this pent-up sectarian conflict and its center is in the heart of the British created Iraq.
[xi] And this title is very telling in regards to a “showing weakness” thesis requiring our continual open ended commitments.  It hasn't been since the entry of Hawaii and Alaska that we have added a star to our flag.  If nothing else, perhaps we need to recognize that unless we seek to literally annex states, perhaps we need to rethink how we demonstrate resolve short of annexation and in a way that enables us to do it in a sustainable manner.

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