Thursday, May 21, 2015

We Together: A Theory, Strategy, and Analysis of How to Conduct the Current Fight against Terrorism

We Together:  A Theory, Strategy, and Analysis of How to Conduct the Current Fight against Terrorism

By Erik C. Backus[i]

Introduction


The following essay is most likely part one of a multi-part exploration that was spurred on by a discussion on Facebook in late March of 2015.  It started with a post on Facebook by Brian Farenell, an astute international affairs watcher in his own right, about the Soviet and, now, American invasions of Afghanistan.  The core of the comment that launched the thread was that we ought to think first about the consequences of our (the US) military involvement or piloting of another region of the world.  The point made is that we need to think about the consequences before we engage in military actions.  The question is what should that response be?  This paper hopes to put forward an analysis, theory, and strategy of what we should attempt going forward in our current fight against terrorism in the world.

Background, History, Premise


As articulated in the thread and previously, when the United States (US) invaded Afghanistan and destroyed the apparatus of the Taliban control of the country, it fulfilled both ethical and strategic aims.  Simply put, knocking out the power broker that clearly stood to enable Al Qaeda (AQ), was the right response after 9-11.  AQ attacked us on 9-11 because it had safe havens in Afghanistan that we did little to nothing to prevent post 1989.[ii]  These safe havens were enabled by a regime that had asserted de facto authority as the nation-state in that part of Central Asia.  So the right action was to cripple that regime, and the power base it came from, such that it had to compete with, at a minimum, and hopefully remain weaker than, other factions in the region in question.  Again as stated in the thread, the mistake we made from the outset, and continue to make, is that we haven't created a multi-faceted version of what our end state is and created multiple paths to get to that point.  Yes, we needed to deteriorate the Taliban, but we also needed, and still need, a strategy that doesn't enable them to simply transplant or to squeeze into yet another safe haven (and therefore perpetuate further terrorism).  We need to have an approach to achieving our strategic end state across the spectrum of cultures and expressions such that we are combating the most heinous challenges, encouraging developments that support our concepts of engagement, and lay foundations to prevent the ability to co-opt and find another reliable swamp from which to foment hate, terrorism, and disenchantment.

So what is that end state and how do we get there?  Great questions and it really requires we analyze the past and come up with the answers.

What Makes Terrorist Safe Havens


One criticism that was received in the thread was that “[w]e know now, and certainly knew then, that terror groups do not need a friendly host nation to survive. Crippling the Taliban was a minor inconvenience to AQ, which just moved across the Pakistan border and continued to function, just as the [Viet Cong] used Laos and Cambodia. It is not even clear that the Taliban had the power to eliminate AQ.”[iii]  Agreed, it does not require the support of a nation-state to provide the fertile ground from which terrorism can grow.  There are, however, certain elements that are consistent in all of the locations, from Yemen, the Maghreb, the Levant, Syria, and the Horn of Africa, South America, etc. etc.  These are:
  1. Financial backing, whether derived from exterior sources funneling funds to the agents of terror or from nascent activities that enable fund support for their efforts (e.g. piracy off of Somalia);
  2. A protective network/governance structure (which includes the absence of any structure as well as a permissive one for terrorism), such that terrorists are able to secure and maintain training camps, logistical hubs, and the ability to travel in and out of these spaces without scrutiny of law as we define it;
  3. A platform from which to spread the ideology and provide "witness" to the power of their objectives, fundamentally grounded in moral grounds as they understand that from their cultural, sectarian, or ethnic perspective; and
  4. An absence of engagement and presence of an alternative that could, will, and can diminish the luster and credibility of the preceding (e.g. we support autocratic regimes that are just as bad as the fundamentalist regimes that we are trying to prevent).
Thus, states aren't the end-all, be-all of the protectors of these groups and efforts, but they can and surely have been one such source.  That said, these factors are useful in how we think about developing a long term strategy for the fight against terrorism.

The Nation-State, or Not


To slightly digress, it is critical to address a point made in the thread in regards to outlooks and the past, in order to think more clearly about a strategy.  We, in the modern west, presume that the nation-state construct is the best to enable security.  This is based upon centuries, if not millennia of culture, thought, and jurisprudence that support these notions. Other parts of the world are not so constructed, and Central Asia is clearly one such place.  The nation-state paradigm doesn't fully cognate and is not adopted, at nearly any level, within the cultures, structures, and ethnicities of Central Asia.  Thus, absent a culture, body of thought and jurisprudence to support a modern sense of nation-state, does it make sense to try to compress over 3000 years of such development and impress upon a people, not so equipped or desirous, to follow such strictures?  The obvious answer is NO.  So one has to postulate, and perhaps much more appropriately so, that creating localized, not centralized control of Afghanistan would be more appropriate.  And, instead of engaging in “nation building”, we should allow somewhat more organic and chaotic development, from their own cultural and societal norms, to get to the place wherein they can work in a more globalized world, which is fundamentally playing by a western playbook.  A better result might occur with such a development that would play off and create checks against influences and parties that would enable safe havens for terrorists and/or consolidation of power that trends in conflict with our strategic aims or around ideologies that do likewise.  This may require a situation in which a region "descends" into "chaos".  To this final point, I will return as I try to explain what I see as a way to facilitate development to meet our strategic aims and avoid the preceding problems.

The American Bias


We, as Americans, typically have an ethnocentric, "we know better" approach to other cultures.[iv]  This was telling in Vietnam, wherein we sought to educate and to, in the infamous words of one officer in the fictional tale of Full Metal Jacket, "… help the Vietnamese, because inside every gook there is an American trying to get out."[v]  This is not only wrong-headed, it’s bound to fail, mainly because we are a product of our heritage, history, culture and thought, just as much as they are.  If we wish them to "act like us", that presumes that they think, have common heritage, history, culture and thought as us.  That simply isn't true.  So we need to instead come to build understanding, and be willing to hazard, that we may change as much as they are changed by us going forward, in an effort to build a common future that obviates those things we find abhorrent.  Not all places, cultures, peoples can or should be crammed into a western post-Westphalia world.  So some places may need to simply left to be messy, yet contained, and engaged with, in a deliberate way.  I presuppose that the world order, that has been created through the imposition of western forms, values, and norms, is one that is the basis to which we aspire all peoples to have the privilege to live within, in so much as it is fair, equitable, protects rights, defends honor, and creates an even playing field (all of which can legitimately be questioned, and probably ought to be in any society, albeit the evidence is fairly robust that representative government, constitutionalism, protection of rights, and being bound by an equitable body of law is highly successful).  So if we seek to enable all peoples to live as we have the privilege to live, we must be willing to let those other cultures get to this place, along the path that makes sense for them to get there.

A New Approach


For this reason, this discussion proposes a much more all-encompassing approach.  It necessitates an international/multi-lateral vision and effort; requires tactical patience and long-ball thinking that spans not only time, but cultural divides, legal norms, and ends that are not defined so much in a singular form as in varied formulations.  We need, therefore, to be, and continue to need to be, much more adroit to engage in a strategy that focuses less in particular means and more in broadly defined ends (but doesn’t lose sight of how we get this done).  Such ends that I am speaking about may require years to achieve and periodic checks to thwart against spoiling the batch without forcing a "one size fits all" construct of what "right looks like".  So the goal then needs to be a set of ends that are defined not as a singular form to follow, but a formulation process that enables cultures to arrive at our conclusions and build upon them.  I am squarely in the Powell camp[vi], on many levels, that we have to have an end-state before engaging military action and clear goals for our international relationships.  But the end state isn't to be like the USA, as we have defined it.  It is to be like the USA in the sense that people got to the same core value statements from their cultural, sectarian, etc. context, and don't see their process as superior or subordinate to another.  We need to put into check those that would stilt, corrupt or accelerate this growth unreasonably.  But we first need to settle, define and get behind the formulation, so we can define the ends and then work to them.

At its core, the end-state we are looking for strategically is not a (necessarily) utopian collection of democratic republics or constitutional monarchies modeled after Western Europe or the US/Canada, but instead republics in the platonic sense[vii].  What we seek are stable “states”, that are on a transect towards constitutionalism, rights protection, and governance based on the consent of the governed.  Depending on the culture they may be better off with a loose confederation of low powered “despots” or nobility that are answerable to a smaller plebiscite.  These may take tribal forms and/or be based on jurgas or similar mechanisms of government.  I can’t go into every example, but the core of it is that we are less looking for democracy as the end state, but instead are looking for stability in terms of governance, culture, participation, and sectarian conflict.  At its core, stability is found not in a nation-state construct, but found in a “right relationship” between the people governed and the formulation of the structures that govern them.

Not the Tyranny of Chaos


So how and what does this look like?  As Brian Farenell indicates, this is all good and well, but “International law and corporatism aside, I think it's wholly irresponsible to invade a country without consideration for what follows after the elimination of the identified threat. Inaction has consequences, but actions do as well.  Debates on such topics generally ignore the reality that the tyranny of chaos is generally more awful than the tyranny of authoritarianism.  We claim we're doing a favor to the (insert oppressed people) by ‘liberating’ them from the Hitler of the Month.  But how, when the chaos that follows causes even more death and destruction?”[viii]  Brian is right, it is specious of us to think of ourselves as the saviors if we have a poor construct for the day after engagement and leave it to utter, tyrannical, chaos as he describes.  Turning then, let’s put forward an alternative in theory and then provide a case study as a potential real answer to how to proceed.

The Theory


The answer comes in a structure of “nation building” that comes in a very different form than we have heretofore constructed it.  A start for this discussion is an idea that I posited in a blog post last year:  “[w]hat I am trying to relay by discussing the [Operation Iraqi Freedom] Surge, and my part in it, is that one of the most powerful things we can do as Americans is make space for success.  COL James Coggin, the Brigade Commander of 3d Training Brigade in 1997-1999, spoke of it as ‘creating an environment for success.’  As I articulated [in that post], we can’t expect every culture, people or nation to follow our path to the high ground.  We can, however, give them the safe space, the boundaries of protection, and the seeds that allow their version of the liberty tree to grow.  But it ultimately is up to them, up to those people to do it.  We can drill the well, we can provide the water purification system, we can train them on how to maintain it, and we can pipe the water that comes out of the system to their homes, but we can’t make them drink it (a modern way of saying, ‘you can bring a horse to water, but can’t force it to drink’).  The leadership the world craves is this creating space, its enabling a surge, but it isn't dictating our terms.  Our unrivaled rise to power in the 20th century was based upon building alliances, meeting on common ground, and ultimately being the ‘convener in chief.’”[ix]  So the core of this is creating the space.

Elements of the Formulation


In order to create this space, there are some necessary elements that prevent a region or culture from becoming prime territory for terrorism or for it to decline from a trajectory of growth that we desire.  These are:
  1. There must exist a sense of self identity and bond as a people.  In ages past this has been articulated as “nationalism” but that may be a crude construct as a “nation” has many meanings.  The key to this element is that there is a sense of combined heritage, destiny, and present commonality amongst and between the populace.  When divisions, sects, race, and other divisive factors exist in a society, absent something that more strongly overrides these divisions, instability is more likely than not, and the ground more fertile to sowing the seeds of discontent, disenfranchisement, extremism, and terrorism.
  2. There must be security from existential threats to the group/people (as is indigenously defined, above).  Assuming that there is a cohesive sense of culture, heritage, destiny and identity as a people, that cohesion is only as good as there isn’t a lurking party to destroy it.  While the sense of threat from without can be a galvanizing influence, it often masks internal divisions that would otherwise tear a group apart.  Thus, for there to be stability, the group has to be able to be self-secure in their geopolitical position, whether locally, regionally, or internationally.
  3. There is a culturally acceptable form of governance that is responsive and responsible to the people.  As stated in the above, this need not be a representative type democracy.  Tribal structures, regional compacts, nested public gatherings, ecclesial structures, and, yes, even monarchy, oligarchy, authoritarianism, and so forth may be among the many other forms of government that works for a particular culture, place or social situation and be the most responsive to the needs of the public.  Having the ability to create stable governing rules of relationship enables commerce, creates clarity, and provides core basic services for society to function.  Absent such a governing structure, that makes sense to the context, either lawlessness will exist or there will be the triggers for potential rebellion/insurgency/revolution/etc.
  4. There is a mechanism to respect rights, redress grievances, and formulate equity and justice.  At its core a society has to have a way to meet out relationships among and between its members and with the governance structure that exists.  The mechanisms may vary, but they need to be present in some form, and at its core help to define jurisprudence for the society.  This may involve what we might consider barbaric practices, but so long as these norms are foundationally in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[x], they should be seen as adequate.
  5. The society has a manner to deal with change and asymmetry.  This is probably the hardest requirement to achieve in a society in order to be able to enable resistance against terrorists.  This is the ability for a society to have ways to deal with inequities and minorities within its culture and all of the above.  It also is ways to contend with changes and growth of a society as it moves forward in time and in terms of its self-understanding of who and what they are.  This is often easily seen in racial relationships, but also is highly important in sectarian engagements.

So in this theoretical framework, it is the ability for us to operate along these elements (self-identity, external security, internal governance, core jurisprudence, and adaptability) that will enable the best chance of success for our foreign engagements.  Every culture, society, “nation” will be at a different place in relation to these elements, and thus our application of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) must be tailored to meet the development need as the society works through the formulation process.

How to do it:  A Case Study


So, again, how?  Perhaps the best way to explain how we can do this is through a case study.  The example that perhaps best fits this is the devolution of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s through the 1990s.  Aptly called “balkanization”[xi], this final throws of a process that actually started at the beginning of the 19th century, provides a place to look at what happened and what could have happened better and a way to apply this theory/strategy.

History and Background


If we look back at the end of the Tito regime in Yugoslavia[xii], it was evident that the ethnic, sectarian, and cultural divides were rearing their heads as the centralizing dominance of Tito waned and eventually ended with his death in 1980.  The reality was that the construct of a nation-state called Yugoslavia was not one of self-determination, but instead a bow to Serbian desires at Versailles after World War I.[xiii]  What was a devolving situation for the Habsburgs prior to World War I, on the heels of the similar devolution of the Ottoman’s Empire, was essentially put into a Yugoslav[xiv] nation-state pot, and sealed with a lid to prevent the further devolution into its massively varied divides (first with a Kingdom, then domination and control of the Axis powers, and then, after the Communist victory after 1945, a totalitarian state).  So when the state was weakened before and around the constitution of 1974, when less and less of a federation existed and more and more a federated state existed, the lid finally began to crack and began the eventual boil-over that resulted in a series of conflicts that, by 1993, provided the borders we recognize in the area today.[xv]

As we look back at the history, early in the process, Europe and the United States seemed almost oblivious and disengaged[xvi] with what was happening in this region as we concluded our focus on winning the Cold War against the Soviet State (which itself devolved after 1989).  But as the news and information streamed out from this region, it became a key focus for NATO writ large and the international community.  As each republic in Yugoslavia spun off, the Serbians attempted to stop that devolution as they saw “Greater Serbia” become more and more a false reality.  The result was armed conflict, in which a UN Force was eventually brought in to mediate and, with US leadership, lead to a peace deal that brought the conflict to an end.  While we can claim, at some level, success in this effort, it wasn’t absent significant loss of life (including genocides), missteps, and several false assumptions as we engaged.

What we could have done


The history here, is what it is, but the question is what could have we done?  That is where we apply this new theory of how we engage in our foreign affairs.  Using the new paradigm, let’s look at the situation that existed and see how we can first analyze and then apply resources to the effort so we can postulate a counter-factual result.

Self-Identity


At the core of the situation in the Balkans, especially in Yugoslavia, was a significant problem in regards to the expression of self-identity.  Each of the cultures, ethnicities, social groups and sects had overlapping perceptions and desires that required resolution.  While several of these had been long pent-up and in some cases forgotten, they existed and needed to be appreciated.  At its core, the crisis that ensued was precisely because long existing divides were poorly understood and thus our ability to engage in the process was stilted and then took several set-backs as we did engage.  Had we spent considerable time trying to fully understand and appreciate the forces of identity and culture within the former Yugoslavia, we could have spent efforts attempting to foster a path that led to a break-up of the former nation-state into a set of borders similar to what we have today, but instead of wars of independence, there could have been a transitional authority that curbed Serbian ambitions, quelled concerns by the Russians of undo western influence in the devolved states, and enabled a coalition to emerge between the states that came into being that allowed for stability at the local level.  As part of this authority it would be critical that mixed ethnicity, sectarian, and cultural areas had representation and the opportunity to resolve conflict as locally as possible and inclusive of enabling displacement by those that wish to relocate into areas in which they self-identify.  Critical to this effort is the enabling those involved to appreciate and understand the differences that exist, as well as commonalities to arrive at (for themselves) who they really are and how they fit into their communities.

External Security


In this situation, while limited, existential threats did exist in the region.  Always in the background was what the Russian state would do in regards to the future of Yugoslavia; likewise NATO.  The inability to address these concerns delayed engagement in the situation, especially as Yugoslavia was not aligned with either the former Soviet state or the West.  If we had engaged earlier with the Russians about their desire to see Serbia to not be weakened to the point that it was an isolated state, perhaps we could have engaged in the region earlier, especially in regards to diplomacy with Serbia and in terms of economic development (especially in terms of arms sales).  Resolving the potential involvement of former Eastern bloc countries and Russia into a part of an authority structure that prevented external direct threats to the process that needed to unfold (see above on self-identity), could have been exceptionally useful.  Getting to the eventual UN Security Council resolutions supporting involvement in this guise (including a limited boots on the ground contingent), earlier than occurred in reality, would have been one means to get to this effort.

Internal Governance


The use of plebiscite in this region has been rife with problems for over a century.  So the idea that sophisticated republican democracy would be the default governmental system, was problematic at best.  The rise of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia was a good sign that governance in this region was a work in process.  As the centralizing power of Tito and his regime waned and eventually became fragmented, the ability to deliver basic services was strained.  At some juncture, the new political order would have to emerge to handle managing the core state services.  Here is where a confederation that took care of the economic and basic services needs could have been useful, allowing the social and political systems to ferret out the needed resolutions to arrive at a stable subsequent system of governance.  The former Yugoslav state brought heavy debt to the situation which only served to exacerbate the problems of governance, as revenues declined in the face of fractious conflict.  Looking at ways to balance and manage taxation and outlays could have mitigated corruption in several aspects of the crisis.  Here is where US power, in combination with the EU could have been highly effective to build an independent series of authorities or corporations that provided basic services that were not aligned with any ethnic, cultural, or sectarian party.

Core Jurisprudence


As the process unfolded, the need to relook at how relationships were to be managed was critical in this situation.  Here is where a set of jurists and experts across the whole of government, could have been engaged to work with the various parties to develop the next generation of justice in the region.  The idea of an independent judiciary was not the norm and needed to be planted and germinated for it to become reality.  To a large degree this needed to be done hand and hand with the effort to look at self-identification.  One of the best ways to have thought about this was to partner European, Russian, and American mentors with judges in the region, perhaps in an oversight role, to avoid state supported abuse of legal systems and to be in the midst of the process to see if and when genocides were about to break-out.  As the new political arrangements came into focus, then constitutional assistance and the creation of core legal rights and protections would have to go forward as well within the new order, working with the new leaders to put them into the core being of who they are as a people.

Adaptability


Lastly, at least in how this is being discussed, is the ability to deal with change and to deal with power balance between portions of the society.  Here is where you had two very problematic efforts that needed to be conducted in parallel.  The Serbs, holding the majority of power, needed to figure out what the future of Serbia was, not as an attack on its existence, but as an evolution to a new state, not physically as large, but potentially as significant in other ways as it had in the past.  The efforts made by the West and sometimes countered by Russia, only served to fuel a strong resentment and feeling of attack of their “country”.  On the other side the Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians, etc. etc., all sought to protect themselves and “get back” at what they saw as Serbian abuses[xvii] and overreach.  Working to develop ways for all sides to develop a unique vision of what the future entailed, that was not inherently in conflict, was critical.  In the real situation, this was nearly impossible to do; however, the eventual peace process did get the parties to this place.  Here is where the Russians, with our urging, could have had a great play into enabling the societies that were emerging to build resilience and power sharing capabilities that kept within the broader Slavic narrative.  The raging philosophical conflict regarding pan-slavism could have been a mechanism for the way to move forward and create ways to contend with power balance within this region as it devolved into constituent but related communities.

The Counterfactual Result:  End State


Let’s posit, then, that we have used this as our guide, what would be the result?  The physical geography would probably look a lot like what we ended up with for borders and so forth.  Politically, however, there might have been a new set of relationships that enabled cooperation between the emerging new order of states, localities, and communities that would be partially co-dependent, and less broken, as a result.  Economically, the years of war and failed governance would have enabled another resurgence of productivity even in the midst of a global recession in the late 2000s.  And with this, a set of narratives and outlooks would be in place that provide for just peace between groups, ways to resolve conflict without violence between people, and have an evolving governing structure that was more and more responsive to the citizens they serve.  There certainly would possibly be some mess, but it would be a way to guide the indigenous populations to work through some of the uglier pieces without long standing detrimental conditions that only breed further conflict and conflagration.

Other Regions/Cases


So as you can see, if we go forward in this process, there are some tangible ways we can and should engage.  The breakup of Yugoslavia is but one example.  Several historic examples could certainly be looked at beyond this, but probably more important is to identify and understand emerging or present situations where we can apply this.  The discussion that spurred this post, centered on Afghanistan, and this is another location that should be considered for how we go forward.  The Middle East, generally, is one that is ripe for the application of this approach.  Similarly the Trans-Caucus, Central Asia, large swaths of Africa, and even in some parts of South America.  One interesting case would be the United Kingdom, probably our most staunch ally.  Looking at this model, if we engage now with this key partner, there is a good case that we can enable the best of possible end states.

US National Interest


In evaluating this approach, one has to ask the key question of why, why do this?  Why is it in the national interest of the United States to engage in this way?  A few facts and/or reasons come quickly to the fore:
1)      The US represents the largest economy in the world; and while China is surely surging, it will remain so for the next several decades.
2)      The US has, by far, the best trained, equipped, and capable military force in the world.  Again, while the People’s Liberation Army is larger, the ability of the US Military to project power and be the arbiter and protector of the sea lanes, coupled the technological capabilities that it has at its disposal, will remain for years to come, without peer even in the face of fiscal challenges ahead.
3)      The national resources which can be allocated to our engagement internationally are indeed dwindling.  The US government continual current budget deficit, long term debt, and intransigence in its ability to develop a long term fiscal policy and plan to deal with numerous liabilities that are growing more significant, is a serious anchor on those resources.  Continued deep engagements for long periods of time, ala Afghanistan today or Europe/Japan of yesteryear, cannot be sustained without international and localized support and additional resources going forward.
4)      International organizations and international norms have been based, chiefly, on American perspectives and values.  Absent a theory and strategy of maintaining engagement, American hegemony in “how the game is played” will wane and potentially falter.  With that ebb, there is a strong potential that another player may fill the vacuum and “change the rule” decidedly against US interests and to the detriment of the American way of life.[xviii]
5)      The lesson of the history of the first half of the 20th Century is that disengagement of the United States as a key actor internationally, has dramatic negative consequences.  Simply put, the US as the largest economy, phenomenally resource rich, and its capacity to be innovative, positively disruptive, and entrepreneurial makes it a cornerstone of the international stage.
6)      Several challenges have now arisen, chief among them terrorism and climate change, that have international ramifications, and that can only truly be shouldered and managed through new forms and norms that adopt an “all-in” and “all-for-one” approach.  Building broad coalitions and capacities to combat these challenges is paramount.  Having an “our way or the highway” approach will be counter-productive in this light; having a strategy that develops partners, as we did in Europe last century, will be the opposite and has a great chance of returning rewards to the nation.
7)      Not all places have, can, and will sustain forms and capacities of nationhood as has been heretofore been presumed.  So we need a new way to avoid the worst possible threats to the homeland and our international interests while providing stability to the greatest degree possible.  A new paradigm can and has to be created to meet that challenge as we deal with the existential threats that are mentioned above.

These seven reasons are simply a start to the reasons that we have to have a new way of thinking and acting.  The national interest here, fundamentally, is to protect the American people and the home-front from existential threats as well as enable the success of American business and other interests beyond the borders of the US.  This strategy can accomplish both and presents a way to do so without the depth of resource drain or risks that current policies and thinking have brought with them.

Conclusion


In conclusion, I think we need to look back on the last century and think about the way we can avoid its worst moments going forward and aspire to its best moments, or better, in this current century.  In the face of communism and the bi-axial nature of international relations in the period leading up to January 1961, President John F. Kennedy put forward to the world and the nation a view of America’s place in his Inaugural Address.  He observed:

“The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe--the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from the hand of God.”[xix]

Amidst this challenge and this world that we faced, he announced:

“Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans--born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage--and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.”[xx]

Knowing that the successes of the recent past were very much in doubt, and wanting to allay the fears of his fellow citizens that the American experiment in democracy, republican government, and freedom was based on anything less than inalienable, universal, human rights and justice for the entirety of the planet, he made a solemn pledge:

“Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”[xxi]

This optimism was not unfounded; it was and is very much a part of who we are as a people.  After all it launched the Peace Corps and put a man on the moon in 10 years.  The challenge, now, is do we have the ability to fulfill this pledge?  Are we really able to or willing “pay any price, bear any burden”?  The incident at the Bay of Pigs may have said otherwise, and sadly, he did not live to see fully, and so did the outgrowth of our engagement in Southeast Asia that was more strongly solidified during his administration.  Vietnam and several other factors had really brought into specific relief that the US had its limits in the world, and by 1974, in the midst of the last throws of the Watergate scandal, America was probably at one of its lowest tides, if not the lowest, in the second half of the 20th century.  The governor of California, previously an actor, and one heck of a communicator, was keen to understand his circumstances and that of the nation.  He offered:

“The lesson of Vietnam, I think, should be that never again will young Americans be asked to fight and possibly die for a cause unless that cause is so meaningful that we, as a nation, pledge our full resources to achieve victory as quickly as possible.”[xxii]

Ronald Reagan was well aware of the gravity of the time, that the Soviet threat hadn’t gone away and we needed to be on the winning side of history in the conflict.  He was keen to look around the world and understand America’s place in it, he offered that:

“We cannot escape our destiny, nor should we try to do so. The leadership of the free world was thrust upon us two centuries ago in that little hall of Philadelphia. In the days following World War II, when the economic strength and power of America was all that stood between the world and the return to the dark ages, Pope Pius XII said, ‘The American people have a great genius for splendid and unselfish actions. Into the hands of America God has placed the destinies of an afflicted mankind.’”[xxiii]

But knowing this, he also knew that at that time and place, there needed to be a new vision and theory for how American was to engage the world.  He decried the current mode of thinking and reminded the audience and us that:

“… even a land as rich as ours can't go on forever borrowing against the future, leaving a legacy of debt for another generation and causing a runaway inflation to erode the savings and reduce the standard of living.”[xxiv]

So he offered the observation and a path forward that found its voice originally in the Bible (Sermon on the Mount, Matthew 5:14-15) but voiced again by a pilgrim to the new world:

“Standing on the tiny deck of the Arabella in 1630 off the Massachusetts coast, John Winthrop said, ‘We will be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us, so that if we deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made a story and a byword throughout the world.’”[xxv]

Reagan’s vision for America to be a “city upon a hill,” enabled a retooling of how we went forward and ultimately resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union’s totalitarian state and its iron grip on Eastern Europe, liberating millions of people.  The long Cold War conflict came to its end, because we re-thought how to meet the needs of the American national interest, without sacrificing our leadership and engagement in the world and retooling how we invested in the future.[xxvi]

It is time again, to do such a rethinking.  While time had passed between Kennedy inaugural and Reagan’s speech, as much has passed between September 11th and today.  A new way forward can and should be imagined.  This is but one set of thoughts on what that might look like.  One thing, I believe, remains true, not just for America, but for all humankind, and that is it is imperative that there is a coherent way to engage going forward.  Ultimately, to take from Reagan, when it comes to our mandate in this effort:

“We [together] are indeed, and we [in partnership] are today, the last best hope of man on earth.”[xxvii]



[i] Erik C. Backus, P.E., LEED AP BD+C, FMP is the Director of Construction Engineering Management at Clarkson University in Potsdam, NY.  He is also a serving Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army Reserve, assigned to the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, G-33 Fwd.  The views contained herein are the authors own and not that of the Government of the United States, the United States Army, the Department of Defense or any subordinate or superior organizations thereof.  Consequently, none of the thoughts and views contained herein, should be or can otherwise be held as policy, guidelines or official statements of the same, and are the opinions, perspectives and musings of the author alone.
[ii] This is crude shorthand for failure to engage in a much more deliberate and less nascent effort to try to build an ally out of the country post 1989.  Like many things in the era of the "Peace Dividend" we indeed meddled in affairs, engaged in counter-terrorism (not as the media speaks of it, but in its true SOF sense) and a host of other actions "on the cheap".  My "nothing" here is short hand for the fact we didn't engage in a Marshall-esk rebuilding with the Mujahidin so as to keep at bay the most radical elements.
[iii] Quote from Paul Grasser in said Facebook thread.
[iv] Critical to this point is the concept “American Exceptionalism”
[v] Source:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0093058/quotes
[vi] By Powell camp, I am referring to the Powell Doctrine (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Powell_Doctrine)
[vii] See Plato, Republic.
[viii] Quote from Brian Farenell in said Facebook thread.
[ix] See my earlier blog post http://backusec.blogspot.com/2014/06/losing-iraq.html
[x] Source:  http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
[xi] Balkanization, as a term, was actually first applied as the Ottoman Empire began to release control of the Balkan Peninsula starting in the early 19th Century
[xii] Much of the history in this section and the case study is borrowed from the synopsis on Wikipedia (viewed on 15 May 15) and from memory of numerous texts and contemporary reporting during the author’s middle and high school years.  This is for brevity sake and to not belabor extensive citations.  Any inaccuracies in the recounting of facts can certainly be scrutinized.  The overall narrative, in the main however, is useful in its own right for the preceding analysis.
[xiii] Although “self-determination” was allegedly a part of Wilson’s 14 points, it was nearly ignored in the creation of this state and his desire to give Serbia a seaport on the Adriatic.
[xiv] Meaning, literally, “South-Slavia”
[xv] Obviously, the case of Kosovo followed, but internationally the borders of Serbia-Montenegro have been stable for some time, with both Kosovo and Montenegro having strong self-rule/determination within the Serbian federation.  At some point it likely that this final stage of balkanization will occur, perhaps as a part of this study, the way forward can be applied and result in a better transition.
[xvi] In truth, we were not, but we certainly did not fully appreciate the powder keg and requirements that were about to ensue as the Yugoslav state fell apart and the Serbian attempted dominance came to the fore.  In the lens of the time, this isn’t a criticism; so much as it is a reality, in that we saw much bigger fish to fry in other parts of Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world.
[xvii] The Serbs, of course were not the only ones seen as abusive of their neighbors.  The Croats, for instance, invaded Bosnia as well to protect what they saw as Croatians that were vulnerable.  It is recognized that the dynamics here are and were more complicated than this short case study analysis can delve into.  That said, it only serves to reinforce the point made in this section that this is the most difficult aspect to work through but it is certainly possible, given the historical record.
[xviii] The British wisely recognized their similar predicament during World War II and engaged in a special relationship with the US to “hand-off” their key world role in a way that promulgated a system that fulfilled their national interest on numerous levels.  There is a serious question if we can find a similar partner that will result in the same success that the British have enjoyed.
[xix] President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961; Retrieved from:  http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/JFK-Quotations/Inaugural-Address.aspx
[xx] Ibid
[xxi] Ibid
[xxii] The future President Ronald Reagan, City Upon a Hill Speech, January 25, 1974; Retrieved from:  http://reagan2020.us/speeches/City_Upon_A_Hill.asp
[xxiii] Ibid
[xxiv] Ibid
[xxv] Ibid
[xxvi] On that latter point, it is legitimate to say that the massive defense spending and other efforts made by the Reagan administration in the 1980s were a clear violation of his criticism about spending and “borrow[ed] against the future, leaving a legacy of debt for another generation.”  Thus, as a bastion of fiscal conservativism he does fail fairly badly.
[xxvii] The future President Ronald Reagan, City Upon a Hill Speech, January 25, 1974; Retrieved from:  http://reagan2020.us/speeches/City_Upon_A_Hill.asp