Losing Iraq?
I have been, over the last few days, enthralled with the
news coming out of Iraq. This is not to
say that I have enjoyed it, but it is to say that I have been very alert to
it. This actually isn't a “just this
week” thing, it’s been months, and years in the making. So, I went ahead and posted to
twitter/Facebook, Fareed Zakaria’s analysis of the situation as of yesterday morning
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fareed-zakaria-who-lost-iraq-the-iraqis-did-with-an-assist-from-george-w-bush/2014/06/12/35c5a418-f25c-11e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html). I typically find his opinions and
prognostications to be “spot on” and in this case he is very close. Being an Iraqi War vet, it is inevitable that
I will be asked my opinion in the coming days, so this is meant to beat you all
to the punch. This is how I see it from
my point of view; there are certain to be others and they are sure to be
different. Take it, leave it, but here
we go:
To start with, let me express my thoughts on the origin of
our involvement in Iraq in 2003 onward.
After the events of September 11, 2001, the world changed. We, for really good reasons, took on the
mantle of fighting a "Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT). This, like the eradication of high seas
piracy in the 19th century[i],
is a task that is necessary and the right thing to do. Such an effort is not a war against a nation-state
but instead a concerted multi-national effort that leads to the extermination
of a global order disease which time has finally come to an end. Terrorism, as a tactic, had great growth in
the Cold War era as a means to engage in low level conflict and protest, short
of conventional war and creating the direct involvement of nation-states
against each other. Such proxy actions
grew in frequency, level of lethality, and broadness of application (across a
full spectrum of cultures, locations, and prefaces). This is an important distinction, as part of
my great support for fighting a GWOT, in that it has a moral and more universal
calling.
Our actions in Afghanistan, therefore, in 2002, to go after
those that perpetrated the act against us on 9-11, were the right things to do. We needed to demonstrate our resolve, to
garner the world's rage against this immoral tactic (that was let to continue
for way too long), put those on notice that had sponsored such a tactic (or
tacitly allowed it to exist), and build a wide coalition that was galvanized
and built to engage in combat through the full spectrum of national and
non-national power (Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics). But when the administration turned to the
next battle that needed to be fought in this "Long War", it was (and
remains decidedly my opinion) that Iraq was not the right field of battle to be
fought on. Such an effort, GWOT, should
never have been pigeon-holed into "Islamic fundamentalist" terrorism,
and regardless if we never uttered that prefix, going into another Middle
Eastern country as the next front we were going to open, spoke loudly that we
had narrowed the scope of our effort and its universal calling was lost. Now we had to defend our actions against the
assertion that we were fighting a war on Islam itself. Now we couldn't easily defend against an
assertion that we were simply seeking a geopolitical play to insert and
dominate the Middle East in a way not seen since the colonial era. Now we showed that it was hollow rhetoric
that the GWOT would be not fought only with military forces but through
numerous other forms of action. Now we
had to make a guard action against critics that we were using this as a means
to secure natural resources (a.k.a. Oil).
And now we lost the goodwill and universality that was behind us only
two years earlier, leaving us with cobbling together a “Coalition of the
Willing” of Britain (our always stalwart ally) and a group of “up and comer”
states or those that could hardly be called world players in the least.
While it is a clear counter-factual to put it forward, my
answer to what to do after assaulting the Taliban and Al Queda in Afghanistan
is to have confronted a number of other terrorist issues the world round. Our next battlefield (since we had the
initiative and choice) would have been better served if we had taken on FARC in
South America, Shining Tigers in Sri Lanka, engaged in meaningful actions in
several sub-Saharan African states, or worked to aid our British allies in its
final and complete resolution and reconciliation of the winding down conflict
over Northern Ireland. And while these
would be superb places to choose, my personal favorite action would have been
to address the narco-terrorism just south of our border in Mexico and Central
America. Alas we didn't make this
choice, and instead chose to settle an old score with a rogue leader, who was
clearly villainous and stubbing nose at the international community. Did he have weapons of mass destruction? Well after a long drawn out drama and search,
we are left wanting in that answer.
Regardless of all the reasons we can now justify the decision to go into
Iraq (and I admit at some point we needed to contend with Saddam Hussein and
his regime), in the context of the GWOT, I just can’t say that it was the correct
next strategic move.
So, I have made my position clear on the choice to go into
Iraq. But when we chose to do that, did
we really understand the implications? I
am not going to comment here on the sales job used to get the American public
and other leaders (Congress et. al.) to go along with it, as that is a topic
for another day. Instead, I am talking
about what we did to plan for the effort once it was the decision made. Secretary of State and GEN Colin Powell
infamously stated the “Pottery Barn rule: You break it, you own it.” in regards
to the implications of invading Iraq and taking over the county as a warning in
the drum up to this invasion[ii]. So if we look back at the run up and planning
for the action we took, much was done, and I remember it greatly as we fixated
on Operations Plan 10-03 and its developing variant (10-03V), in late 2002 and
early 2003. Much of the talk and
thinking was that when we invaded we would be met with open arms, the
well-educated Iraqi population would take over the task of governing
themselves, oil revenues would subsidize and pay for the effort as well as the
Iraqi led rebuilding effort, and we would build a grateful democratic ally in
the very center of the Middle East. This
narrative fit well into the neo-con anti-nation building mantra. Thus all planning efforts focused on the
invasion and military conquest, and limited if any effort was made to plan for
“the day after”. Actually, I can recall
those who questioned our lack of thinking-though our involvement after the
invasion, as being told a mantra like “we are going to take as much risk
leaving as we are in going in[iii]”
or getting askance looks if they were to suggest that we would have to engage
in a meaningful rebuilding and security effort once the conventional war
ended. GEN Eric Shinseki was famously
ostracized by Paul Wolfowitz for his comment that it would take “something in
the order of several hundred thousand soldiers” to pacify and control Iraq
after the invasion[iv]. So, when it comes to my thoughts on the
conduct of the invasion and the efforts in the early days of the Iraq war, I
have to relay one of my most poignant stories from June 2003 in Baghdad.
Our unit, a Combat Heavy Engineer Battalion, was the first
of its kind to make its way to Baghdad as a part of TF Iron (part of 1st
Armor Division) who followed the 3d Infantry Division in the northern invasion
thrust. After leading the first convoy
north from Kuwait in the very early hours of June 1st, A Company had
worked for a couple weeks on building a bed down site in what was formerly a
field, literally a mine field, asking each day what our mission was to be. And just before I was temporarily reassigned
for a special mission in downtown Baghdad rooting out insurgents, we held a
meeting with the Company leadership.
Paul Drezen, the Company Commander, having now heard the inquiry of each
of his platoon leaders and platoon sergeants at least a dozen times ask, “what
is our mission” or “what is the plan”, was simply frustrated to his limit (and
the daily temps warming up well past the upper 90s and low 100s without a
stitch of A/C may have also had something to do with it). In this meeting, one of the leadership team
again asked this question, and Paul, in utter frustration, launched an apple
across the room and yawped “there is no fucking plan!” In a nutshell, that is the reality of the
situation for the first 6 to 9 months after “major combat operations” had ended[v]. After doing some minimal tasks and fill-in
work, at one point, one of my soldiers finally had enough and spoke out talking
about his being “Underemployed in Iraq” in a letter to the editor of Stars and
Stripes[vi]. Thus the truth is that no one minded Powell’s
advice and even made the attempt to recognize the need for a plan and the
ownership for fixing the broken Iraq once we had opted to invade.
Now that I have taken on two points, and have been rather
honest in my not being enthralled with the choice to center on Iraq as the next
point of attack or with the planning for the occupation, I need to square this
with my taking part and following orders as a loyal soldier. Let’s start with an old euphemism: “Our job is not to ask how or why, but to do
or die.” I am an Army Officer, and as
such I have sworn a very sacred oath (I said I swore to God). Let me relay that Oath to you, verbatim, as I
uttered it on May 17, 1997: “I, Erik C.
Backus, having been appointed an officer in the Army of the United States, as
indicated above in the grade of O-1, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;
that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservations or purpose
of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the
office upon which I am about to enter; So help me God.” Regardless of my personal or political
feelings, my reasoning or any emotional calling I may feel, I have made a
promise, and if I learned nothing from the character given to me from my years
in scouting and leadership, your promise is what make you who you are. So when you talk to soldiers, especially
soldiers who are called to be leaders, we understand that once all of the
debating is done, it is time for us to salute, adopt the decision, and execute
as if it was our own idea, with passion, violence, and vigor. Nothing is less true for me and this
effort. I had and have my qualms on
whether it was the right decision, I may know that the plan is utterly flawed
and devoid of needed resources to ensure victory, and I personally simply may
not want to go (and trust me getting the call that I was being deployed on
valentine’s day weekend in 2003 was a serious downer; never mind spending my
wife’s birthday at Fort Leonard Wood getting my collective stuff together); but I am a man of
honor, and I am honor bound to do my duty.
That oath I swore says that I will support and defend the constitution,
and to do that I have to obey the will of the people (the document starts with
“We the people …” after all) and not my personal whims and judgments, at least
in regards to whether I hazard to obey those authorities. Several high profile cases have occurred
where others have forgotten this oath and this sacred duty and tried to shirk
or obviate from it. Regardless of my
reservations, I would not be caught ever as being disloyal in that way, nor
should we ever let those that have taken the office I have taken, do so (for if
we do, we allow the prerogative of one to trump the will of the people, and
that is antithetical to the core of the American democratic experiment).
I have now used very lofty and noble terms have talked about
my military service and how I have approached being an Officer in the US Army,
especially in my taking up the mandate of serving in a war zone, in Iraq. But, I think I am part of the problem; well
actually, I think everyone else has the problem, I just think that my attitudes
effect everyone else’s problem. The
problem I am talking about, and it relates to our getting into Iraq, the
prosecution of any concerted national effort, war or otherwise, is that we have
a 1% problem. By 1% I am not talking to
an economic number. I am talking to a
much more (potentially) insidious problem, the percentage of those that have taken
an oath and put themselves in the position to be a bullet catcher and/or a
bullet shooter on behalf of “We the People”.
Sebastian Junger talks about this, in his discussion of how some
soldiers who take on this mandate deal with the emotional, mental, and
psychological effects of combat when they come back home[vii]. This 1% represents those that have the level
of commitment I have, and have actioned on it.
It is also a testament to how our society has changed in the last 75
years. The idea that we all hold such a
sacred duty has been diluted; and as such the common person’s understanding and
appreciation of the service rendered is equally lost. This is a dangerous thing. It isn't dangerous because we need to broaden
military service; it’s dangerous because we have failed to broaden and
inculcate a culture of selfless service.
To this point, when we look back to the days, weeks, and months after
the attacks of 9-11, the number one question Americans, and the vast majority
globally, asked was “How can we serve?”
The answer given was “go out and buy a Chevy.” That isn't exactly what we were asking, I am
certain of it. But it speaks to the
problem. Our leaders have sold us a new
definition of what civic virtue is all about; it’s a definition that this
virtue is fungible. It neglects the
self-reflection required to require sacrifice.
And as a consequence it is easy for the 99% to be persuaded to commit
the sacrifice of a small minority to a mission of futility, error, or
success. And this translates well beyond
military service (whether it be foreign service, the peace corps, inner city education,
border security, or any other niche effort that requires giving up comfort and your life for
a greater cause). And what I am
postulating here is that because of this loss of core values of universal
sacrifice and service (beyond and without a value that can be substituted),
going headlong into a new war or understanding the implications of our domestic
or foreign policy is a task that we, as a people, are ill equipped to
handle. And it is those that have made
sacrifices that are the odd ones out, and to some extent (because we have
continued to buoy the facade that we can go on this way) are why we went into
and out of Iraq/Afghanistan the way we have.
This then turns me to another part of my thoughts on the
last weeks’ worth of news on Iraq. When
I was deployed for my second tour, our Brigade commander gathered the entire headquarters
for a discussion and talked about our mission and how our efforts would be long
studied and remembered given the impacts we had made on Iraq. Without question this commander was
brilliant, and was adroit in citing the long view of history as it related to what
he was discussing. He hearkened back to
the Roman Empire and reasoned that one of the things that led to the failure of
the Roman largess was that they began to show weakness and that the
“barbarians” outside the borders of the Empire smelled it[viii]. This thesis is not without merit, but you
need to be mindful of the setting of the “show of weakness”. To cut to the quick here, if there is a goal
to prevent the demise of American influence on world events, we need to watch,
ameliorate, and control our hubris and our ethnocentrism as Americans. Certainly I believe that the US is the best
nation that has ever existed in the history of the earth. And I am not discounting that we have much
much more to offer. That doesn’t mean,
however, that we ought to pick fights/put ourselves into situations where we
risk our leading position and ability to enable humanity at large to enjoin us
in our march towards freedom, liberty and progress. It means we need to be the beacon on the hill
that the world is drawn to, rather than the spot light in their face that
blinds them. This is why not every fight
is our fight, not every problem is ours to solve. And we have to remember our principles are
the core piece and not only the government form that is supposed to protect
them. So an Iraq, Haiti, Thailand, or a
Kenya may have a way to get themselves to a just state that honors the rule of
law through a very different way than getting people to the voting booth. It certainly means that we need to hold up
our example of republican government as an ongoing experiment, one that is in
constant need of maintenance, and not the end-all be-all of political systems. And it means that we can’t continue to spew out
hollow, unsupported largess the world round, as the thin veiled shell that is
created by such bellicose invites a test of our resolve and will surely find it
wanting in one place or another. We need
to under promise, over execute, and recognize our true strength is in our
character as a people; a character that others can aspire to obtain.
Let us, then, talk about inspiration. I served two tours in Iraq. The first, from 2003-2004, was the one that
started without a plan, and went on to fail to stop rioting/looting, dismiss
the Iraqi Army enmasse, engage in a systematic campaign of deBaathification,
fail to bring the resources to bear to be able to re-build and build a
sustainable economy, and resulted in the start of widespread unrest as I was
departing in May 2004. Succinctly, on
the whole, this was not inspirational. And
as I watched from the US for the next 3 years, the story didn't really change,
as what appeared to be happening was just spiraling to an ever increasingly
challenging situation. But, the story
was not over. After recognizing the
reality was different than the dream, the administration under the leadership
of voices that converted from “never do nation building” to another place, proposed
one massive push to turn the tide and re-engage in a new way. “Take, hold, build” was the mantra, and a brilliant
leader, who hadn't followed the trend in the first year of the war that
everyone else had, was appointed to lead the charge: GEN David Petreaus. Using his on-the-ground experience in northern
Iraq (when he was a division commander of the famed 101st Air Assault
Division), armed with a new set of doctrines that were gleaned from the annals
of history, and given the actual resources to make the difference that was
needed, he, with the team assembled around him and the country of Iraq, was
able to turn the war on its head during “The Surge”. In the 18 months that started in the spring
of 2007, every major indicator was adjusted in a positive direction. Bridges got built, unemployment went down,
security was established, and Iraq started working again. This was inspiring and it was the right thing
to do (even if I was somewhat jaded about its possibilities at the outset).
What I am trying to relay by discussing the Surge, and my
part in it, is that one of the most powerful things we can do as Americans is make
space for success. COL James Coggin, the
Brigade Commander of 3d Training Brigade in 1997-1999, spoke of it as “creating
an environment for success”. As I
articulated above, we can’t expect every culture, people or nation to follow
our path to the high ground. We can, however, give them the safe space, the
boundaries of protection, and the seeds that allow their version of the liberty
tree to grow. But it ultimately is up to
them, up to those people to do it. We
can drill the well, we can provide the water purification system, we can train
them on how to maintain it, and we can pipe the water that comes out of the system
to their homes, but we can’t make them drink it (a modern way of saying, “you
can bring a horse to water, but can’t force it to drink”). The leadership the world craves is this
creating space, its enabling a surge, but it isn't dictating our terms. Our unrivaled rise to power in the 20th
century was based upon building alliances, meeting on common ground, and
ultimately being the “convener in chief”[ix]. And as we look to how we fight the GWOT, we
can’t forget that this is what we do best, and it is also the way that we have
been able to create a pervasive world order that serves us well while also
letting others go their own way.
So this brings us to my comments on the ever present
counter-factual question of “should we have stayed?” Frankly, I don’t know. But my sense is that if we couldn't get a
SOFA that protected those of us who were going to be there to continue the
effort, it wasn't worth staying. I
reiterate, what we can do best is give the space, we can get them to the edge
of the lake, but we can’t make them swim in it.
And while the current administration should have certainly pressed to
the Nth degree to enable us to follow-up on the strategic victory we had in the
Surge, there is also a point to be made that we have to cut the umbilical cord
at some point. And we also have to
recognize that a Marshall Plan like solution in Iraq was simply not in the offing
for numerous reasons[x]. So we need to level with ourselves about what
kinds of commitments we make. To that end,
we are where we are in regards to not having troops in Iraq, less by desire and
more by pragmatic realities; realities we can no-longer ignore lest we sacrifice
more of our future. Thus I go back to we
have to be much more introspective and clear about those battles we are going
to fight or those efforts we are going to take on.
Now back to the news of the week. Is Iraq lost?
The one thing that I take issue with in Fareed’s analysis is the imminent
and ultimate collapse of the present Iraqi state. Surely the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
taking “control” of Mosul and Tikrit, and making its way south, is troubling
and doesn't spell a good outcome. The
struggle, however, is far from over. Just
this morning, reports were that Shia Arab Iraqis were answering the call to
arms issued by Ayatollah Sistani.
Likewise, it is certain that the Kurds in Northern Iraq are not going to
succumb to this insurgent group, and may be more than willing to come down from
the hills and thwart their gains. So, I
am not so certain we can call the game before it’s played here. I am certain it will be a mess and
bloody. And it will be something that
will not comfort any of us who did our best to build an Iraq that could execute
the power brokering as well as the political and sectarian resolutions needed to be
a beacon of stability in the Middle East.
But in the end, I would not be surprised if a stable nation state
emerged from the ashes, and perhaps that is the way it has to be. Unless we intend to make Iraq a part of the
United States unilaterally, we have little choice but to accept it isn't up to
us what the Iraqi future is. Not jumping
back in does not mean we failed before, nor does ISIS pressing its way through
the country. It just means we have to
let it play out for and with the Iraqi’s themselves.
What I am struck by, as I conclude, is how Fareed continues to
hit issues on their head. One of my
favorite texts by him is “The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad”. I first read this text just after arriving
home in 2004 from Iraq. Its concluding
chapter, the afterword, is entitled “The 51st State”[xi]. Fareed in a few pages provides an erudite
analysis of the situation with the invasion and its immediate aftermath. He then goes on to provide a prognostication
based upon the fundamental thesis of the book (that democracy follows the development
of a constitutional structure and rule of law, not the other way around). He writes: “In the next year or two, it will
likely seem that democracy in Iraq is working.
A new government will be formed.
Elections will be held. Hope will
fill the air. But that does not necessarily
mean that democracy in Iraq will last. The
decay of democracy usually takes place a few years after the birth. It can be prevented, of course, and the United
States should do all it can to make democracy stick. But ultimately it is Iraqis who will build
the new Iraq.” I think we have done what
we could, it was a noble and worthwhile effort even given its mistaken origins,
and I couldn't agree more with his ultimate conclusion.
[i] For a great discussion of this connection, see Caleb
Carr's “The Lessons of Terror: A History
of Warfare Against Civilians: Why It Has Always Failed and Why It Will Fail
Again”, written in 2002
[ii] From
Bob Woodward’s “Plan of Attack” in 2004
[iii] In
October 2002 I was lucky enough to get an opportunity to attend my War-Trace
conference with the 36th Engineer Brigade (then stationed at Fort
Benning) and was read in on the base OPLAN 10-03, which was then under
review. In speaking with the FORSCOM
Engineer he spoke to this very attitude.
[iv] See
Shinseki’s Testimony and http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/28/us/threats-responses-military-spending-pentagon-contradicts-general-iraq-occupation.html
[v] I’m
referring to the “Mission Accomplished Speech” by President George W. Bush on
May 1, 2003
[vi] By
Justin Stenger, a talented soldier and hard worker who wanted nothing more than
to make a contribution for the good of his country; http://www.stripes.com/opinion/letters-to-the-editor-for-wednesday-november-19-2003-1.14619
[vii] If you
have any desire to really start to get at the perspective of solders who have
been engaged in combat in the modern age in Afghanistan and Iraq, you need to
read “War” by Sebastian. Probably the
best journalism/book that I have ever encountered on the perspective of a
soldier like myself in how we see ourselves and the wars we have fought.
[viii] BG
Peter “Duke” Deluca, channeling Edward Gibbon and “The History of the Decline
and Fall of the Roman Empire”
[ix] For
example: Eleanor Roosevelt and the
process that led to the UN Charter
[x] If we
look at the comparisons between 2010 and 1945, several things come to
light: 1) After the devastation of WWII,
the US was largely untouched, and as a result was the only remaining world
power that had the ability to produce goods in mass quantities without massive
investments. Thus, we were in an
enviable economic situation, without rival (the USSR, especially east of the Urals, also was not as devastated,
but its industrial centers were set back at least a decade). In 2010, the story was and remains different. China and India, among others, are in serious
competition with us economically, and our savings reserves are non-existent. 2) Iraq/Afghanistan are not Europe. By this I mean, all of the European states
were rebuilding in a cultural context similar to our own and thus the ability
to resurrect democratic governance, rule of law, religious and cultural norms
was much less foreign and relatable to the common American. The Middle East continues to represent a
distinctly different world than ours, and while there are connections, they are
much more tenuous and hard to relate. 3)
Europe in 1945 didn't have a trust fund status.
By this I mean, there wasn't some signature natural resource that was
needed by the world that was going to be argued over and cause a societal
rift. Iraq’s oil is a blessing and a
curse in this regard. 4) Europe had
settled the religious divide question in Christianity after an exhaustive period
that it had no desire to repeat. The
Middle East has been prevented from having the conflict required to resolve the
Sunni/Shia rift, first by the Ottomans, then by the Sykes-Picot European
creation, and then by the overshadow of the Cold War. We are now seeing the outbursts of this pent-up
sectarian conflict and its center is in the heart of the British created Iraq.
[xi] And
this title is very telling in regards to a “showing weakness” thesis requiring our
continual open ended commitments. It
hasn't been since the entry of Hawaii and Alaska that we have added a star to
our flag. If nothing else, perhaps we
need to recognize that unless we seek to literally annex states, perhaps we
need to rethink how we demonstrate resolve short of annexation and in a way
that enables us to do it in a sustainable manner.
