We Together: A Theory, Strategy, and Analysis of How to Conduct the Current Fight against Terrorism
By Erik C. Backus[i]
Introduction
The following essay is most likely part one of a multi-part
exploration that was spurred on by a discussion on Facebook in late March of
2015. It started with a post on Facebook
by Brian Farenell, an astute international affairs watcher in his own right,
about the Soviet and, now, American invasions of Afghanistan. The core of the comment that launched the
thread was that we ought to think first about the consequences of our (the US) military
involvement or piloting of another region of the world. The point made is that we need to think about
the consequences before we engage in military actions. The question is what should that response be? This paper hopes to put forward an analysis, theory,
and strategy of what we should attempt going forward in our current fight
against terrorism in the world.
Background, History, Premise
As articulated in the thread and previously, when the United
States (US) invaded Afghanistan and destroyed the apparatus of the Taliban
control of the country, it fulfilled both ethical and strategic aims. Simply put, knocking out the power broker that
clearly stood to enable Al Qaeda (AQ), was the right response after 9-11. AQ attacked us on 9-11 because it had safe
havens in Afghanistan that we did little to nothing to prevent post 1989.[ii] These safe havens were enabled by a regime
that had asserted de facto authority as the nation-state in that part of
Central Asia. So the right action was to
cripple that regime, and the power base it came from, such that it had to
compete with, at a minimum, and hopefully remain weaker than, other factions in
the region in question. Again as stated
in the thread, the mistake we made from the outset, and continue to make, is
that we haven't created a multi-faceted version of what our end state is and
created multiple paths to get to that point.
Yes, we needed to deteriorate the Taliban, but we also needed, and still
need, a strategy that doesn't enable them to simply transplant or to squeeze
into yet another safe haven (and therefore perpetuate further terrorism). We need to have an approach to achieving our
strategic end state across the spectrum of cultures and expressions such that
we are combating the most heinous challenges, encouraging developments that
support our concepts of engagement, and lay foundations to prevent the ability
to co-opt and find another reliable swamp from which to foment hate, terrorism,
and disenchantment.
So what is that end state and how do we get there? Great questions and it really requires we
analyze the past and come up with the answers.
What Makes Terrorist Safe Havens
One criticism that was received in the thread was that “[w]e
know now, and certainly knew then, that terror groups do not need a friendly
host nation to survive. Crippling the Taliban was a minor inconvenience to AQ,
which just moved across the Pakistan border and continued to function, just as
the [Viet Cong] used Laos and Cambodia. It is not even clear that the Taliban
had the power to eliminate AQ.”[iii] Agreed, it does not require the support of a
nation-state to provide the fertile ground from which terrorism can grow. There are, however, certain elements that are
consistent in all of the locations, from Yemen, the Maghreb, the Levant, Syria,
and the Horn of Africa, South America, etc. etc. These are:
- Financial backing, whether
derived from exterior sources funneling funds to the agents of terror or
from nascent activities that enable fund support for their efforts (e.g.
piracy off of Somalia);
- A protective network/governance
structure (which includes the absence of any structure as well as a
permissive one for terrorism), such that terrorists are able to secure and
maintain training camps, logistical hubs, and the ability to travel in and
out of these spaces without scrutiny of law as we define it;
- A platform from which to
spread the ideology and provide "witness" to the power of their
objectives, fundamentally grounded in moral grounds as they understand
that from their cultural, sectarian, or ethnic perspective; and
- An absence of engagement
and presence of an alternative that could, will, and can diminish the
luster and credibility of the preceding (e.g. we support autocratic
regimes that are just as bad as the fundamentalist regimes that we are trying
to prevent).
Thus, states aren't the end-all, be-all of the protectors of
these groups and efforts, but they can and surely have been one such source. That said, these factors are useful in how we
think about developing a long term strategy for the fight against terrorism.
The Nation-State, or Not
To slightly digress, it is critical to address a point made in
the thread in regards to outlooks and the past, in order to think more clearly
about a strategy. We, in the modern
west, presume that the nation-state construct is the best to enable security. This is based upon centuries, if not millennia
of culture, thought, and jurisprudence that support these notions. Other parts
of the world are not so constructed, and Central Asia is clearly one such
place. The nation-state paradigm doesn't
fully cognate and is not adopted, at nearly any level, within the cultures,
structures, and ethnicities of Central Asia. Thus, absent a culture, body of thought and
jurisprudence to support a modern sense of nation-state, does it make sense to
try to compress over 3000 years of such development and impress upon a people,
not so equipped or desirous, to follow such strictures? The obvious answer is NO. So one has to postulate, and perhaps much
more appropriately so, that creating localized, not centralized control of
Afghanistan would be more appropriate. And,
instead of engaging in “nation building”, we should allow somewhat more organic
and chaotic development, from their own cultural and societal norms, to get to
the place wherein they can work in a more globalized world, which is
fundamentally playing by a western playbook.
A better result might occur with such a development that would play off
and create checks against influences and parties that would enable safe havens
for terrorists and/or consolidation of power that trends in conflict with our
strategic aims or around ideologies that do likewise. This may require a situation in which a
region "descends" into "chaos". To this final point, I will return as I try
to explain what I see as a way to facilitate development to meet our strategic
aims and avoid the preceding problems.
The American Bias
We, as Americans, typically have an ethnocentric, "we
know better" approach to other cultures.[iv] This was telling in Vietnam, wherein we
sought to educate and to, in the infamous words of one officer in the fictional
tale of Full Metal Jacket, "… help the Vietnamese, because inside every
gook there is an American trying to get out."[v] This is not only wrong-headed, it’s bound to
fail, mainly because we are a product of our heritage, history, culture and
thought, just as much as they are. If we
wish them to "act like us", that presumes that they think, have
common heritage, history, culture and thought as us. That simply isn't true. So we need to instead come to build
understanding, and be willing to hazard, that we may change as much as they are
changed by us going forward, in an effort to build a common future that
obviates those things we find abhorrent.
Not all places, cultures, peoples can or should be crammed into a
western post-Westphalia world. So some
places may need to simply left to be messy, yet contained, and engaged with, in
a deliberate way. I presuppose that the
world order, that has been created through the imposition of western forms,
values, and norms, is one that is the basis to which we aspire all peoples to
have the privilege to live within, in so much as it is fair, equitable,
protects rights, defends honor, and creates an even playing field (all of which
can legitimately be questioned, and probably ought to be in any society, albeit
the evidence is fairly robust that representative government,
constitutionalism, protection of rights, and being bound by an equitable body
of law is highly successful). So if we
seek to enable all peoples to live as we have the privilege to live, we must be
willing to let those other cultures get to this place, along the path that
makes sense for them to get there.
A New Approach
For this reason, this discussion proposes a much more all-encompassing
approach. It necessitates an
international/multi-lateral vision and effort; requires tactical patience and
long-ball thinking that spans not only time, but cultural divides, legal norms,
and ends that are not defined so much in a singular form as in varied formulations. We need, therefore, to be, and continue to
need to be, much more adroit to engage in a strategy that focuses less in
particular means and more in broadly defined ends (but doesn’t lose sight of
how we get this done). Such ends that I
am speaking about may require years to achieve and periodic checks to thwart
against spoiling the batch without forcing a "one size fits all"
construct of what "right looks like".
So the goal then needs to be a set of ends that are defined not as a singular
form to follow, but a formulation process that enables cultures to arrive at
our conclusions and build upon them. I
am squarely in the Powell camp[vi],
on many levels, that we have to have an end-state before engaging military
action and clear goals for our international relationships. But the end state isn't to be like the USA, as
we have defined it. It is to be like the
USA in the sense that people got to the same core value statements from their
cultural, sectarian, etc. context, and don't see their process as superior or
subordinate to another. We need to put
into check those that would stilt, corrupt or accelerate this growth
unreasonably. But we first need to
settle, define and get behind the formulation, so we can define the ends and
then work to them.
At its core, the end-state we are looking for strategically
is not a (necessarily) utopian collection of democratic republics or
constitutional monarchies modeled after Western Europe or the US/Canada, but
instead republics in the platonic sense[vii]. What we seek are stable “states”, that are on
a transect towards constitutionalism, rights protection, and governance based
on the consent of the governed.
Depending on the culture they may be better off with a loose
confederation of low powered “despots” or nobility that are answerable to a
smaller plebiscite. These may take
tribal forms and/or be based on jurgas or similar mechanisms of
government. I can’t go into every
example, but the core of it is that we are less looking for democracy as the
end state, but instead are looking for stability in terms of governance, culture,
participation, and sectarian conflict.
At its core, stability is found not in a nation-state construct, but
found in a “right relationship” between the people governed and the formulation
of the structures that govern them.
Not the Tyranny of Chaos
So how and what does this look like? As Brian Farenell indicates, this is all good
and well, but “International law and corporatism aside, I think it's wholly irresponsible
to invade a country without consideration for what follows after the
elimination of the identified threat. Inaction has consequences, but actions do
as well. Debates on such topics
generally ignore the reality that the tyranny of chaos is generally more awful
than the tyranny of authoritarianism. We
claim we're doing a favor to the (insert oppressed people) by ‘liberating’ them
from the Hitler of the Month. But how,
when the chaos that follows causes even more death and destruction?”[viii] Brian is right, it is specious of us to think
of ourselves as the saviors if we have a poor construct for the day after engagement
and leave it to utter, tyrannical, chaos as he describes. Turning then, let’s put forward an
alternative in theory and then provide a case study as a potential real answer
to how to proceed.
The Theory
The answer comes in a structure of “nation building” that
comes in a very different form than we have heretofore constructed it. A start for this discussion is an idea that I
posited in a blog post last year: “[w]hat
I am trying to relay by discussing the [Operation Iraqi Freedom] Surge, and my
part in it, is that one of the most powerful things we can do as Americans is
make space for success. COL James
Coggin, the Brigade Commander of 3d Training Brigade in 1997-1999, spoke of it
as ‘creating an environment for success.’
As I articulated [in that post], we can’t expect every culture, people
or nation to follow our path to the high ground. We can, however, give them the safe space,
the boundaries of protection, and the seeds that allow their version of the
liberty tree to grow. But it ultimately
is up to them, up to those people to do it.
We can drill the well, we can provide the water purification system, we
can train them on how to maintain it, and we can pipe the water that comes out
of the system to their homes, but we can’t make them drink it (a modern way of
saying, ‘you can bring a horse to water, but can’t force it to drink’). The leadership the world craves is this creating
space, its enabling a surge, but it isn't dictating our terms. Our unrivaled rise to power in the 20th
century was based upon building alliances, meeting on common ground, and
ultimately being the ‘convener in chief.’”[ix] So the core of this is creating the space.
Elements of the Formulation
In order to create this space, there are some necessary
elements that prevent a region or culture from becoming prime territory for terrorism
or for it to decline from a trajectory of growth that we desire. These are:
- There must exist a sense
of self identity and bond as a people.
In ages past this has been articulated as “nationalism” but that
may be a crude construct as a “nation” has many meanings. The key to this element is that there is
a sense of combined heritage, destiny, and present commonality amongst and
between the populace. When
divisions, sects, race, and other divisive factors exist in a society,
absent something that more strongly overrides these divisions, instability
is more likely than not, and the ground more fertile to sowing the seeds
of discontent, disenfranchisement, extremism, and terrorism.
- There must be security
from existential threats to the group/people (as is indigenously defined,
above). Assuming that there is a
cohesive sense of culture, heritage, destiny and identity as a people,
that cohesion is only as good as there isn’t a lurking party to destroy
it. While the sense of threat from
without can be a galvanizing influence, it often masks internal divisions
that would otherwise tear a group apart.
Thus, for there to be stability, the group has to be able to be
self-secure in their geopolitical position, whether locally, regionally,
or internationally.
- There is a culturally
acceptable form of governance that is responsive and responsible to the
people. As stated in the above,
this need not be a representative type democracy. Tribal structures, regional compacts,
nested public gatherings, ecclesial structures, and, yes, even monarchy,
oligarchy, authoritarianism, and so forth may be among the many other
forms of government that works for a particular culture, place or social
situation and be the most responsive to the needs of the public. Having the ability to create stable
governing rules of relationship enables commerce, creates clarity, and
provides core basic services for society to function. Absent such a governing structure, that
makes sense to the context, either lawlessness will exist or there will be
the triggers for potential rebellion/insurgency/revolution/etc.
- There is a mechanism to
respect rights, redress grievances, and formulate equity and justice. At its core a society has to have a way
to meet out relationships among and between its members and with the
governance structure that exists.
The mechanisms may vary, but they need to be present in some form,
and at its core help to define jurisprudence for the society. This may involve what we might consider
barbaric practices, but so long as these norms are foundationally in line
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[x],
they should be seen as adequate.
- The society has a manner
to deal with change and asymmetry. This
is probably the hardest requirement to achieve in a society in order to be
able to enable resistance against terrorists. This is the ability for a society to
have ways to deal with inequities and minorities within its culture and
all of the above. It also is ways
to contend with changes and growth of a society as it moves forward in
time and in terms of its self-understanding of who and what they are. This is often easily seen in racial
relationships, but also is highly important in sectarian engagements.
So in this theoretical framework, it is the ability for us
to operate along these elements (self-identity, external security, internal
governance, core jurisprudence, and adaptability) that will enable the best
chance of success for our foreign engagements.
Every culture, society, “nation” will be at a different place in
relation to these elements, and thus our application of national power (diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic) must be tailored to meet the development
need as the society works through the formulation process.
How to do it:
A Case Study
So, again, how? Perhaps
the best way to explain how we can do this is through a case study. The example that perhaps best fits this is
the devolution of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s through the 1990s. Aptly called “balkanization”[xi],
this final throws of a process that actually started at the beginning of the 19th
century, provides a place to look at what happened and what could have happened
better and a way to apply this theory/strategy.
History and Background
If we look back at the end of the Tito regime in Yugoslavia[xii],
it was evident that the ethnic, sectarian, and cultural divides were rearing
their heads as the centralizing dominance of Tito waned and eventually ended
with his death in 1980. The reality was
that the construct of a nation-state called Yugoslavia was not one of self-determination,
but instead a bow to Serbian desires at Versailles after World War I.[xiii] What was a devolving situation for the
Habsburgs prior to World War I, on the heels of the similar devolution of the
Ottoman’s Empire, was essentially put into a Yugoslav[xiv]
nation-state pot, and sealed with a lid to prevent the further devolution into
its massively varied divides (first with a Kingdom, then domination and control
of the Axis powers, and then, after the Communist victory after 1945, a totalitarian
state). So when the state was weakened
before and around the constitution of 1974, when less and less of a federation
existed and more and more a federated state existed, the lid finally began to crack
and began the eventual boil-over that resulted in a series of conflicts that,
by 1993, provided the borders we recognize in the area today.[xv]
As we look back at the history, early in the process, Europe
and the United States seemed almost oblivious and disengaged[xvi]
with what was happening in this region as we concluded our focus on winning the
Cold War against the Soviet State (which itself devolved after 1989). But as the news and information streamed out
from this region, it became a key focus for NATO writ large and the
international community. As each
republic in Yugoslavia spun off, the Serbians attempted to stop that devolution
as they saw “Greater Serbia” become more and more a false reality. The result was armed conflict, in which a UN
Force was eventually brought in to mediate and, with US leadership, lead to a
peace deal that brought the conflict to an end.
While we can claim, at some level, success in this effort, it wasn’t
absent significant loss of life (including genocides), missteps, and several
false assumptions as we engaged.
What we could have done
The history here, is what it is, but the question is what
could have we done? That is where we
apply this new theory of how we engage in our foreign affairs. Using the new paradigm, let’s look at the
situation that existed and see how we can first analyze and then apply
resources to the effort so we can postulate a counter-factual result.
Self-Identity
At the core of the situation in the Balkans, especially in
Yugoslavia, was a significant problem in regards to the expression of
self-identity. Each of the cultures,
ethnicities, social groups and sects had overlapping perceptions and desires
that required resolution. While several
of these had been long pent-up and in some cases forgotten, they existed and
needed to be appreciated. At its core,
the crisis that ensued was precisely because long existing divides were poorly
understood and thus our ability to engage in the process was stilted and then
took several set-backs as we did engage.
Had we spent considerable time trying to fully understand and appreciate
the forces of identity and culture within the former Yugoslavia, we could have
spent efforts attempting to foster a path that led to a break-up of the former
nation-state into a set of borders similar to what we have today, but instead
of wars of independence, there could have been a transitional authority that
curbed Serbian ambitions, quelled concerns by the Russians of undo western
influence in the devolved states, and enabled a coalition to emerge between the
states that came into being that allowed for stability at the local level. As part of this authority it would be critical
that mixed ethnicity, sectarian, and cultural areas had representation and the
opportunity to resolve conflict as locally as possible and inclusive of
enabling displacement by those that wish to relocate into areas in which they
self-identify. Critical to this effort is
the enabling those involved to appreciate and understand the differences that
exist, as well as commonalities to arrive at (for themselves) who they really
are and how they fit into their communities.
External Security
In this situation, while limited, existential threats did
exist in the region. Always in the
background was what the Russian state would do in regards to the future of
Yugoslavia; likewise NATO. The inability
to address these concerns delayed engagement in the situation, especially as
Yugoslavia was not aligned with either the former Soviet state or the
West. If we had engaged earlier with the
Russians about their desire to see Serbia to not be weakened to the point that
it was an isolated state, perhaps we could have engaged in the region earlier,
especially in regards to diplomacy with Serbia and in terms of economic
development (especially in terms of arms sales). Resolving the potential involvement of former
Eastern bloc countries and Russia into a part of an authority structure that
prevented external direct threats to the process that needed to unfold (see
above on self-identity), could have been exceptionally useful. Getting to the eventual UN Security Council
resolutions supporting involvement in this guise (including a limited boots on
the ground contingent), earlier than occurred in reality, would have been one
means to get to this effort.
Internal Governance
The use of plebiscite in this region has been rife with problems
for over a century. So the idea that
sophisticated republican democracy would be the default governmental system,
was problematic at best. The rise of Slobodan
Milošević in Serbia was a good sign that governance in this region was a work
in process. As the centralizing power of
Tito and his regime waned and eventually became fragmented, the ability to
deliver basic services was strained. At
some juncture, the new political order would have to emerge to handle managing
the core state services. Here is where a
confederation that took care of the economic and basic services needs could
have been useful, allowing the social and political systems to ferret out the
needed resolutions to arrive at a stable subsequent system of governance. The former Yugoslav state brought heavy debt
to the situation which only served to exacerbate the problems of governance, as
revenues declined in the face of fractious conflict. Looking at ways to balance and manage
taxation and outlays could have mitigated corruption in several aspects of the
crisis. Here is where US power, in
combination with the EU could have been highly effective to build an
independent series of authorities or corporations that provided basic services
that were not aligned with any ethnic, cultural, or sectarian party.
Core Jurisprudence
As the process unfolded, the need to relook at how
relationships were to be managed was critical in this situation. Here is where a set of jurists and experts
across the whole of government, could have been engaged to work with the
various parties to develop the next generation of justice in the region. The idea of an independent judiciary was not
the norm and needed to be planted and germinated for it to become reality. To a large degree this needed to be done hand
and hand with the effort to look at self-identification. One of the best ways to have thought about
this was to partner European, Russian, and American mentors with judges in the
region, perhaps in an oversight role, to avoid state supported abuse of legal
systems and to be in the midst of the process to see if and when genocides were
about to break-out. As the new political
arrangements came into focus, then constitutional assistance and the creation
of core legal rights and protections would have to go forward as well within
the new order, working with the new leaders to put them into the core being of
who they are as a people.
Adaptability
Lastly, at least in how this is being discussed, is the
ability to deal with change and to deal with power balance between portions of
the society. Here is where you had two
very problematic efforts that needed to be conducted in parallel. The Serbs, holding the majority of power,
needed to figure out what the future of Serbia was, not as an attack on its
existence, but as an evolution to a new state, not physically as large, but
potentially as significant in other ways as it had in the past. The efforts made by the West and sometimes
countered by Russia, only served to fuel a strong resentment and feeling of
attack of their “country”. On the other
side the Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians, etc. etc., all sought to protect
themselves and “get back” at what they saw as Serbian abuses[xvii]
and overreach. Working to develop ways
for all sides to develop a unique vision of what the future entailed, that was
not inherently in conflict, was critical.
In the real situation, this was nearly impossible to do; however, the
eventual peace process did get the parties to this place. Here is where the Russians, with our urging,
could have had a great play into enabling the societies that were emerging to
build resilience and power sharing capabilities that kept within the broader
Slavic narrative. The raging
philosophical conflict regarding pan-slavism could have been a mechanism for
the way to move forward and create ways to contend with power balance within
this region as it devolved into constituent but related communities.
The Counterfactual Result: End State
Let’s posit, then, that we have used this as our guide, what
would be the result? The physical
geography would probably look a lot like what we ended up with for borders and
so forth. Politically, however, there
might have been a new set of relationships that enabled cooperation between the
emerging new order of states, localities, and communities that would be
partially co-dependent, and less broken, as a result. Economically, the years of war and failed
governance would have enabled another resurgence of productivity even in the
midst of a global recession in the late 2000s.
And with this, a set of narratives and outlooks would be in place that
provide for just peace between groups, ways to resolve conflict without violence
between people, and have an evolving governing structure that was more and more
responsive to the citizens they serve.
There certainly would possibly be some mess, but it would be a way to
guide the indigenous populations to work through some of the uglier pieces
without long standing detrimental conditions that only breed further conflict
and conflagration.
Other Regions/Cases
So as you can see, if we go forward in this process, there
are some tangible ways we can and should engage. The breakup of Yugoslavia is but one
example. Several historic examples could
certainly be looked at beyond this, but probably more important is to identify
and understand emerging or present situations where we can apply this. The discussion that spurred this post,
centered on Afghanistan, and this is another location that should be considered
for how we go forward. The Middle East,
generally, is one that is ripe for the application of this approach. Similarly the Trans-Caucus, Central Asia,
large swaths of Africa, and even in some parts of South America. One interesting case would be the United
Kingdom, probably our most staunch ally.
Looking at this model, if we engage now with this key partner, there is
a good case that we can enable the best of possible end states.
US National Interest
In evaluating this approach, one has to ask the key question
of why, why do this? Why is it in the
national interest of the United States to engage in this way? A few facts and/or reasons come quickly to
the fore:
1) The
US represents the largest economy in the world; and while China is surely
surging, it will remain so for the next several decades.
2) The
US has, by far, the best trained, equipped, and capable military force in the
world. Again, while the People’s Liberation
Army is larger, the ability of the US Military to project power and be the
arbiter and protector of the sea lanes, coupled the technological capabilities
that it has at its disposal, will remain for years to come, without peer even
in the face of fiscal challenges ahead.
3) The
national resources which can be allocated to our engagement internationally are
indeed dwindling. The US government continual
current budget deficit, long term debt, and intransigence in its ability to
develop a long term fiscal policy and plan to deal with numerous liabilities that
are growing more significant, is a serious anchor on those resources. Continued deep engagements for long periods of
time, ala Afghanistan today or Europe/Japan of yesteryear, cannot be sustained
without international and localized support and additional resources going
forward.
4) International
organizations and international norms have been based, chiefly, on American
perspectives and values. Absent a theory
and strategy of maintaining engagement, American hegemony in “how the game is
played” will wane and potentially falter.
With that ebb, there is a strong potential that another player may fill
the vacuum and “change the rule” decidedly against US interests and to the
detriment of the American way of life.[xviii]
5) The
lesson of the history of the first half of the 20th Century is that
disengagement of the United States as a key actor internationally, has dramatic
negative consequences. Simply put, the
US as the largest economy, phenomenally resource rich, and its capacity to be
innovative, positively disruptive, and entrepreneurial makes it a cornerstone
of the international stage.
6) Several
challenges have now arisen, chief among them terrorism and climate change, that
have international ramifications, and that can only truly be shouldered and
managed through new forms and norms that adopt an “all-in” and “all-for-one”
approach. Building broad coalitions and
capacities to combat these challenges is paramount. Having an “our way or the highway” approach
will be counter-productive in this light; having a strategy that develops
partners, as we did in Europe last century, will be the opposite and has a
great chance of returning rewards to the nation.
7) Not
all places have, can, and will sustain forms and capacities of nationhood as has
been heretofore been presumed. So we
need a new way to avoid the worst possible threats to the homeland and our
international interests while providing stability to the greatest degree
possible. A new paradigm can and has to
be created to meet that challenge as we deal with the existential threats that
are mentioned above.
These seven reasons are simply a start to the reasons that
we have to have a new way of thinking and acting. The national interest here, fundamentally, is
to protect the American people and the home-front from existential threats as
well as enable the success of American business and other interests beyond the
borders of the US. This strategy can
accomplish both and presents a way to do so without the depth of resource drain
or risks that current policies and thinking have brought with them.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I think we need to look back on the last
century and think about the way we can avoid its worst moments going forward
and aspire to its best moments, or better, in this current century. In the face of communism and the bi-axial
nature of international relations in the period leading up to January 1961,
President John F. Kennedy put forward to the world and the nation a view of
America’s place in his Inaugural Address.
He observed:
“The world is very different now.
For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human
poverty and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for
which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe--the belief that
the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from the hand
of God.”[xix]
Amidst this challenge and this world that we faced, he
announced:
“Let the word go forth from this
time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a
new generation of Americans--born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined
by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage--and unwilling to
witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation
has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and
around the world.”[xx]
Knowing that the successes of the recent past were very much
in doubt, and wanting to allay the fears of his fellow citizens that the
American experiment in democracy, republican government, and freedom was based
on anything less than inalienable, universal, human rights and justice for the
entirety of the planet, he made a solemn pledge:
“Let every nation know, whether it
wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the
success of liberty.”[xxi]
This optimism was not unfounded; it was and is very much a
part of who we are as a people. After
all it launched the Peace Corps and put a man on the moon in 10 years. The challenge, now, is do we have the ability
to fulfill this pledge? Are we really
able to or willing “pay any price, bear any burden”? The incident at the Bay of Pigs may have said
otherwise, and sadly, he did not live to see fully, and so did the outgrowth of
our engagement in Southeast Asia that was more strongly solidified during his
administration. Vietnam and several
other factors had really brought into specific relief that the US had its
limits in the world, and by 1974, in the midst of the last throws of the
Watergate scandal, America was probably at one of its lowest tides, if not the
lowest, in the second half of the 20th century. The governor of California, previously an actor,
and one heck of a communicator, was keen to understand his circumstances and
that of the nation. He offered:
“The lesson of Vietnam, I think,
should be that never again will young Americans be asked to fight and possibly
die for a cause unless that cause is so meaningful that we, as a nation, pledge
our full resources to achieve victory as quickly as possible.”[xxii]
Ronald Reagan was well aware of the gravity of the time,
that the Soviet threat hadn’t gone away and we needed to be on the winning side
of history in the conflict. He was keen
to look around the world and understand America’s place in it, he offered that:
“We cannot escape our destiny, nor
should we try to do so. The leadership of the free world was thrust upon us two
centuries ago in that little hall of Philadelphia. In the days following World
War II, when the economic strength and power of America was all that stood
between the world and the return to the dark ages, Pope Pius XII said, ‘The
American people have a great genius for splendid and unselfish actions. Into
the hands of America God has placed the destinies of an afflicted mankind.’”[xxiii]
But knowing this, he also knew that at that time and place,
there needed to be a new vision and theory for how American was to engage the
world. He decried the current mode of
thinking and reminded the audience and us that:
“… even a land as rich as ours
can't go on forever borrowing against the future, leaving a legacy of debt for
another generation and causing a runaway inflation to erode the savings and
reduce the standard of living.”[xxiv]
So he offered the observation and a path forward that found
its voice originally in the Bible (Sermon on the Mount, Matthew 5:14-15) but
voiced again by a pilgrim to the new world:
“Standing on the tiny deck of the
Arabella in 1630 off the Massachusetts coast, John Winthrop said, ‘We will be
as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us, so that if we deal
falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken and so cause Him to
withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made a story and a byword
throughout the world.’”[xxv]
Reagan’s vision for America to be a “city upon a hill,”
enabled a retooling of how we went forward and ultimately resulted in the
collapse of the Soviet Union’s totalitarian state and its iron grip on Eastern
Europe, liberating millions of people.
The long Cold War conflict came to its end, because we re-thought how to
meet the needs of the American national interest, without sacrificing our
leadership and engagement in the world and retooling how we invested in the
future.[xxvi]
It is time again, to do such a rethinking. While time had passed between Kennedy
inaugural and Reagan’s speech, as much has passed between September 11th
and today. A new way forward can and
should be imagined. This is but one set
of thoughts on what that might look like.
One thing, I believe, remains true, not just for America, but for all
humankind, and that is it is imperative that there is a coherent way to engage
going forward. Ultimately, to take from Reagan,
when it comes to our mandate in this effort:
“We [together] are indeed, and we [in
partnership] are today, the last best hope of man on earth.”[xxvii]
[i] Erik C. Backus, P.E., LEED
AP BD+C, FMP is the Director of Construction Engineering Management at Clarkson
University in Potsdam, NY. He is also a
serving Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army Reserve, assigned to the Office of
the Chief of the Army Reserve, G-33 Fwd.
The views contained herein are the authors own and not that of the
Government of the United States, the United States Army, the Department of
Defense or any subordinate or superior organizations thereof. Consequently, none of the thoughts and views
contained herein, should be or can otherwise be held as policy, guidelines or
official statements of the same, and are the opinions, perspectives and musings
of the author alone.
[ii] This is crude shorthand
for failure to engage in a much more deliberate and less nascent effort to try
to build an ally out of the country post 1989. Like many things in the era of the "Peace
Dividend" we indeed meddled in affairs, engaged in counter-terrorism (not
as the media speaks of it, but in its true SOF sense) and a host of other actions
"on the cheap". My
"nothing" here is short hand for the fact we didn't engage in a
Marshall-esk rebuilding with the Mujahidin so as to keep at bay the most
radical elements.
[iii] Quote from Paul Grasser
in said Facebook thread.
[iv] Critical to this point is
the concept “American Exceptionalism”
[v] Source: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0093058/quotes
[vi] By Powell camp, I am
referring to the Powell Doctrine (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Powell_Doctrine)
[vii] See Plato, Republic.
[viii] Quote from Brian
Farenell in said Facebook thread.
[ix] See my earlier blog post http://backusec.blogspot.com/2014/06/losing-iraq.html
[x] Source: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
[xi] Balkanization, as a term,
was actually first applied as the Ottoman Empire began to release control of
the Balkan Peninsula starting in the early 19th Century
[xii] Much of the history in
this section and the case study is borrowed from the synopsis on Wikipedia
(viewed on 15 May 15) and from memory of numerous texts and contemporary
reporting during the author’s middle and high school years. This is for brevity sake and to not belabor
extensive citations. Any inaccuracies in
the recounting of facts can certainly be scrutinized. The overall narrative, in the main however,
is useful in its own right for the preceding analysis.
[xiii] Although
“self-determination” was allegedly a part of Wilson’s 14 points, it was nearly
ignored in the creation of this state and his desire to give Serbia a seaport
on the Adriatic.
[xiv] Meaning, literally, “South-Slavia”
[xv] Obviously, the case of
Kosovo followed, but internationally the borders of Serbia-Montenegro have been
stable for some time, with both Kosovo and Montenegro having strong
self-rule/determination within the Serbian federation. At some point it likely that this final stage
of balkanization will occur, perhaps as a part of this study, the way forward
can be applied and result in a better transition.
[xvi] In truth, we were not,
but we certainly did not fully appreciate the powder keg and requirements that
were about to ensue as the Yugoslav state fell apart and the Serbian attempted
dominance came to the fore. In the lens
of the time, this isn’t a criticism; so much as it is a reality, in that we saw
much bigger fish to fry in other parts of Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the
world.
[xvii] The Serbs, of course
were not the only ones seen as abusive of their neighbors. The Croats, for instance, invaded Bosnia as
well to protect what they saw as Croatians that were vulnerable. It is recognized that the dynamics here are
and were more complicated than this short case study analysis can delve
into. That said, it only serves to
reinforce the point made in this section that this is the most difficult aspect
to work through but it is certainly possible, given the historical record.
[xviii] The British wisely
recognized their similar predicament during World War II and engaged in a
special relationship with the US to “hand-off” their key world role in a way
that promulgated a system that fulfilled their national interest on numerous
levels. There is a serious question if
we can find a similar partner that will result in the same success that the
British have enjoyed.
[xix] President John F.
Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961; Retrieved from: http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/JFK-Quotations/Inaugural-Address.aspx
[xx] Ibid
[xxi] Ibid
[xxii] The future President Ronald
Reagan, City Upon a Hill Speech, January 25, 1974; Retrieved from: http://reagan2020.us/speeches/City_Upon_A_Hill.asp
[xxiii] Ibid
[xxiv] Ibid
[xxv] Ibid
[xxvi] On that latter point,
it is legitimate to say that the massive defense spending and other efforts
made by the Reagan administration in the 1980s were a clear violation of his
criticism about spending and “borrow[ed] against the future, leaving a legacy
of debt for another generation.” Thus,
as a bastion of fiscal conservativism he does fail fairly badly.
[xxvii] The future President Ronald
Reagan, City Upon a Hill Speech, January 25, 1974; Retrieved from: http://reagan2020.us/speeches/City_Upon_A_Hill.asp
